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INTRODUCTION
The phrase sexual harassment was made in America, by
women.' It appeared simultaneously in theoretical writing and the
popular media. Before the phrase emerged, Redbook magazine
published a questionnaire asking women about sexual intimidation
at work; nine thousand women responded, beginning a nationwide
discussion that continues to deepen and spread.2 Soon Catharine
MacKinnon, in her pathbreaking book, connected sexual harassment
with sex discrimination law.' This change in consciousness was
rapid. Within a few years, a phrase emerged to describe that which
once "did not socially 'exist,' had no shape, no cognitive coher-
ence."4
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' Early instances of the term sexual harassment appear in the writings of the
Working Women United Institute, the Alliance Against Sexual Coercion, and
CARROLL BRODSKY, THE HARASSED WORKER (1976). See CATHARINE A. MACKINNON,
SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WORKING WOMEN 27-28 & n.13 (1979).
2 The questionnaire was published in the January 1976 issue of Redbook. See
Wendy Pollack, Sexual Harassment: Women's Experience vs. Legal Definitions, 13 HARV.
WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 42 (1990) (citations omitted); see also Eliza G.C. Collins & Timothy
B. Blodgett, Sexual Harassment: Some See It... Some Won't, HARv. Bus. REV., Mar.-
Apr. 1981, at 76 (joint survey by Harvard Business Review and Redbook).
3 See MACKINNON, supra note 1.
4 CATHARINE MACKINNON, FEMINISM UNMODIFIED 106 (1987).
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Slowly this American idea crossed the Atlantic. Arriving in
Europe, it found expatriate companionship in the law books. From
the place where political questions usually become legal ones,
5
European nations and the European Community6 have over the
decades acquired an array of legal change: labor statutes only
lightly rewritten, 7 bankruptcy law,' the principle that race and sex
discrimination ought to be actionable,9 the concept of products
liability,1 ° franchising law,11 and other innovations. 12  The jour-
ney of law from west to east is a famous one. Equally familiar is the
debate within comparative law of how borrowing takes place
generally, and whether it can work."
s "II n'est presque pas de question politique, aux Etats Unis, qui ne se rdsolve t6t
ou tard en question judiciaire." 2 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DE LA D9MOCRATIE EN
AM9RIQUE 181 (17th ed. 1888). Tocqueville used "America" and "the United States"
interchangeably; in this Article I try to stick to the latter, but I have been unable to
avoid "American" as a modifier or shorthand for "person located in the United
States."
6 This Article focuses on sexual harassment and workplace discrimination in the
law of the European Community and some of the laws of its member states; it
compares these laws and related practices to the American experience. Because the
newer term "European Union" has not yet achieved wide usage, and for the sake of
consistency with cited materials, I have stuck with the traditional "European
Community." The "European Community" is occasionally abbreviated "EC," in
accord with the current convention; for historical reasons, however, the major
founding document of the European Community is abbreviated "EEC Treaty." Notes
14, 19, and 21 explain various decisions made to keep this focus limited. Notes 50,
52, 54, and 59, and the text accompanying note 144 provide a brief glossary of some
European Community jargon for the non-expert reader.
' See Lorraine M. McDonough, Comment, The Transferability of Labor Law: Can
an American Transplant Take Root in British Soil?, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 504 (1992).
'See Maximilian Schiessl, On the Road to a New German Reorganization Law-A
Comparative Analysis of the Draft Proposed by the Insolvenzrechtskommission and Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 62 AM. BANKR. L.J. 233, 248 (1988).
' See Alan Riding, Europeans Discover Sexual Harassmen but They Don't Complain
Much, INT'L HERALD TRIB., Nov. 7, 1992, at 1.
9 See Anita Bernstein, L'Harmonie Dissonante: Strict Products Liability Attempted
in the European Community, 31 VA.J. INT'L L. 673 (1991).
n See CHRISTIAN JOERGES, FRANCHISING AND THE LAW: THEORETICAL AND
COMPARATIVE APPROACHES IN EUROPE AND THE UNITED STATES (1991).
1 On the influence of American law generally, see Wolfgang Wiegand, The
Reception of American Law in Europe, 39 AM.J. COMP. L. 229 (1991).
On borrowing, Montesquieu was pessimistic: "Les lois politiques et civiles de
chaque nation ... doivent etre tellement propres au peuple pour lequel cies sont
faites, que c'est un tr~s-grand hazard si celles d'une nation peuvent convenir a une
autre." CHARLES SECONDAT DE MONTESQUIEU, DE L'ESPRIT DES LOIS 81 (Paris,
Garnier Frhres 1922) (1748). Compare Alan Watson, Legal Transplants and Law
Reform, 92 LAW Q. REV. 79 (1976) and Alan Watson, Comparative Law and Legal
Change, 37 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 313 (1978) (arguing that borrowing can take place
satisfactorily with no knowledge of the context of the foreign law, and listing eight
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In this Article, I examine workplace sexual harassment 14 as an
instance of comparative law that has received little attention in the
literature-the effect of borrowing on the donor. Comparative law
typically looks at one vector: a nation gives and another accepts.
As I have done previously, I propose that American law be reexam-
ined after Europe has borrowed it. 5  The enterprise seems
necessary for several reasons. "The American law of sexual harass-
ment," whatever that entity may be, moves and changes constantly.
This change is taking place now, fast.' In a shrunken world,
foreign influences easily join domestic ones. Thus the American law
of sexual harassment cannot be understood without identifying the
way that law has been seen and received outside of the United
States.
Moreover, the receipt of sexual harassment law by the European
Community and the member states is a rare example of borrowing
between two entities that can be described approximately as
coequals, even though one is a unified superpower and the other a
supragovernment with equal power only when viewed as the sum of
many states. The history of comparative law reform tells of
conqueror and conquered," influential and influenced." Accord-
"factors" that influence reception of the foreign law) with 0. Kahn-Freund, On Uses
and Misuses of Comparative Law, 37 MOD. L. REv. 1 (1974) (arguing that the social and
political context of donor law must be understood before successful borrowing can
occur). See also McDonough, supra note 7 (applying Kahn-Freund and Watson
approaches to the borrowing of labor law).
1' I limit my scope to the workplace, although sexual harassment exists in schools,
housing, family and quasi-family relationships, prisons, and almost any setting where
people with unequal power coexist. This narrower focus is suitable for comparative
enquiry. Workplace conflicts predominate in regulations and case law in all countries
that prohibit sexual harassment. Many countries' laws do not even acknowledge the
existence of sexual harassment outside the workplace. Hereinafter, I use "sexual
harassment" to mean "workplace sexual harassment" except where a broader meaning
is clear from the text or context.
15 See Anita Bernstein, Looking at Europe for the Difference Between Strict and Fault-
Based Liability, 14J. PROD. LIAB. 207 (1992).
16 Changes on the horizon that I see as I write may be either status quo or stale
utopianism at the time of publication. Nonetheless, three examples present
themselves. Some members of Congress appear seriously willing to make themselves
legally accountable for claims of sexual harassment. See Timothy Egan, Accusations
Against Senator May Pose Test for Congress, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1992, at Al0. A new
tort of sexual harassment is taking shape in scholarly writingand may gain acceptance
in the courts. See infra part I.B.3.b. Finally, legislation has been introduced in the
California state assembly to outlaw the sexual harassment of women in public streets.
See A Move to Protect Women from 'Street Harassment,' N.Y. TIMES, July 2, 1993, at D9.
17 See e.g., Sally F. Moore, Treating Law as Knowledge: Telling Colonial Officers What
to Say to Africans About Running "Their Own" Native Courts, 26 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 11
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ingly, it appears to have been naive to speak of comparison (even
the metaphor of borrowing seems a euphemism) and thereby deny
the pressure of power. By the 1980s, when Europe began to look
to the United States to create its law of sexual harassment, donor
and borrower had reached an approximate equality of importance
and strength. 9 Thus comparative sexual harassment law represents
a different kind of comparative law, in a New World Order as it
were, and it questions assumptions about reform by emulation. The
genre of comparative law is expanded.
Comparing European and American sexual harassment law
expands another genre, legal feminism, 2' by contributing a specific
instance that can be studied closely.21 The data found here are
comparable to other factual markers that anchor feminist theory-
data such as the percentage of men's earnings that women earn and
the availability of abortion and contraception. Within the important
subject of international and comparative feminist scholarship,22
comparative sexual harassment law adds specificity. Sexual
(1992) (discussing the imposition of concepts such as the Rule of Law).
18 See supra text accompanying notes 5-12.
19 For this reason I limit my comparison to the European Community. For a
wider comparative survey of legal approaches to sexual harassment coveringJapan,
Canada, and non-EC European countries as well as the Community member nations,
see International Labour Office, Combating Sexual Harassment at Work, 11 CONDITIONS
WORK DIG. 65-175 (1992).
20 Because women experience sexual harassment much more often than men, the
subject of sexual harassment fits within the genre of legal feminism; and, for the same
reason, I observe the academic convention of referring to recipients of harassment
with feminine pronouns.
21 1 have chosen to focus on sexual harassment rather than the larger subject of
sex discrimination in the workplace for two reasons. First, comparative sex
discrimination law is a topic of encyclopedic complexity, too large for an article. See
infra notes 135, 138-42 and accompanying text (offering a partial list of EC directives
and proposals that pertain to women's employment). Perhaps more important,
workplace sexual harassment is not merely a subset of employment discrimination
law, and it warrants its own study. See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, FORBIDDEN GROUNDS:
THE CASE AGAINST EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAwS 357-66 (1992) (describing
sexual harassment as an experience that takes place between individuals); Ellen F.
Paul, Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination: A Defective Paradigm, 8 YALE L. & POL'Y
REV. 333 (1990) (repudiating group-based approaches to sexual harassment); see also
infra part III.A (proposing that sexual harassment be regarded as a detrimental
workplace condition).
' For a sample, see SUSAN BASSNETT, FEMINIST EXPERIENCES: THE WOMEN'S
MOVEMENT IN FOUR CULTURES (1986); HESTER EISENSTEIN, GENDER SHOCK:
PRACTICING FEMINISM ON TWO CONTINENTS (1991); JOYCE GELB, FEMINISM AND
POLITICS: A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE (1989); YAYORI MATSUI, WOMEN'S ASIA
(1989); GILLIAN ROSE, FEMINISM AND GEOGRAPHY (1993); THIRD WORLD WOMEN AND
THE POLITICS OF FEMINISM (Chandra Talpade et al. eds., 1991).
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harassment law in all countries is a written law (although it extends,
of course, beyond what can be read in the codes and rules). It
includes regulation, party-initiated dispute resolution, exhortation,
punishment, and an array of legal, equitable, and novel remedies.
Because of its breadth-a breadth that gets wider under comparative
study-sexual harassment law connects feminist theory with a range
of topics. Race is a prominent example."3  Connections such as
these enhance feminist theory.
As I elaborate below, however, the enhancement of feminist
theory by these connections is offset by a related concern.
Attention to the European experience suggests that feminist
reformers can increase the number of influenced listeners by
showing how a problem they have identified extends beyond the
feminist agenda. In a place where feminists have less influence than
they do in the United States, this expansion was necessary. Applied
in the United States, the expansion could win over new supporters
and create a more powerful political alliance. Feminists, however,
risk the loss of some control over the reform effort. I conclude that
the benefits of expansion outweigh the drawbacks, that widening the
understandings of sexual harassment would result in overall
improvement of the law.
A word on improvement of the law. One comparativist
assumption is that comparing begets improving. Here I wish to
refine that assumption, and again sexual harassment becomes a
challenging topic for comparative law. At least at present, and
perhaps indefinitely, American and European attitudes toward
sexual harassment are different. An observer cannot look with
equal favor on both sets of laws because each reflects contrary value
choices about confrontation, power, the merits of informal or
extralegal dispute resolution, and the roles of men and women. I
' In European and American workplaces, women of color are more vulnerable
than white women to sexual harassment. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 53;
MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN & INEKE M. DE VRIES, HOW TO COMBAT SEXUAL HARASSMENT:
A GUIDE IMPLEMENTING THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION CODE OF PRACTICE 11 (1993).
In scholarship many writers have described the challenge of responding to the
problem of sexual harassment without neglecting related questions of race. See, e.g.,
CATHARINE MACKINNON, ONLY WORDS 63-64 (1993) (discussing themes common to
racial and sexual harassment); RACE-ING JUSTICE, EN-GENDERING POWER (Toni
Morrison ed., 1992) (collection of essays assembled after Hill/Thomas hearings);
Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theoty, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581,
592 (1990) (arguing that most scholarship about sexual harassment excludes the
experience of nonwhite women); see also infra part III.B.I.b.
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do not, therefore, envision improvement in the sense of a middle
ground between two traditions.
Improvement, should it come, emerges rather from the study of
American and European contributions to the subject, which I detail
in the two succeeding parts of this Article. In Part I ("From West
to East"), I describe sexual harassment-both the concept and the
domain of legal regulation-as an American initiative, showing
where American contributions lie, and the degree to which they
have been received in Europe. The European contribution, I argue
in Part II ("From East to West"), consists of skepticism. Some
experts question the authority of the Community to make law in this
area; Europeans are dubious about party-initiated law as a cure for
society's infirmities; and in Europe little faith appears to exist in the
ability of courts to discern whether an accused harasser was at fault.
Comparative sexual harassment law, as we will see, does not fit
easily in scholarly paradigms of improvement, cultural obstacles to
borrowing, adaptation, or other familiar experiences, although it
contains elements of all of these. Europe neither copied nor
rejected the American offering. It responded to American influence
receptively, but also with doubt. These European contributions, as
I describe them, appear slight at first glance. They are not
comprehensive and ambitious, like the American offerings; nor do
they purport to refute the substance of American initiative. But this
doubt is more than mere rejection: it has vital, forward-moving
properties. European skepticism can be melded with American
initiative so that American (and also European) reformers can better
achieve the sexual harassment law they want.
Questions of European Community jurisdiction comprise the
best-documented example of European skepticism. When feminists
and other reformers began to create Community-wide law to help
prevent and remedy sexual harassment for the benefit of hundreds
of millions of Europeans, they met with a plausible and cogent
response: the European Community exists to promote economic
union, not a cultural or ideological agenda. In reaction to doubt
about jurisdiction, partisans of sexual harassment legislation came
up with pragmatic tactics and conceptual advances that moved
sexual harassment into the legal domain of the Community.
24
24 The history of American law reform also includes examples of this expansive
approach. See infra text accompanying notes 330-34 (chronicling various efforts of
American reformers to build linkages with other causes). However, the approach has
been underutilized in the area of sexual harassment.
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A second example of skepticism concerns litigation as a device
for cultural and social reform. Because of their doubts about
litigation-a skepticism that American feminist commentators often
share-Europeans have found alternatives that give harassed persons
more methods of recourse. Demurring on the question of fault,
Europeans may appear either liberated from American zeal or
deplorably lax in the presence of wrongdoing, depending on one's
point of view. Regardless of the moral truth of the European
posture, however, American fixation on fault has not always worked
to the advantage of victims of sexual harassment.
Having identified some differences between the United States
and the European Community on the question of sexual harass-
ment, I turn next to applications. Part III of the Article explores
the uses of comparative study: how Americans interested in the
problem of sexual harassment can combine their initiative with
European skepticism. Their challenge consists of extracting the best
elements of a system that is hostile to civil litigation as a device for
change, while retaining the benefits of American-style liability-that
is, they must borrow eclectically. Some guidance for this compari-
son is available. While Americans see the problem of sexual
harassment as either wrongful private conduct between two people
or as sex discrimination, Europeans have shaped it as a problem of
workers, and sited the problem in the workplace. In the United
States, sexual harassment is a legal wrong; in Europe-with the
exception of extreme situations that amount to blackmail or physical
violence-sexual harassment is atmosphere, conditions, an obstruc-
tion, or trouble, with very little blame from the law. Not for a
moment do I argue that this European view amounts to a superior
approach. Indeed I condemn the occasional tendency of Americans
to defer to Europeans in the belief that they are exceptionally
advanced in matters of sex. 5 Given the existence of real differenc-
es between the two places, however, Americans ought to learn from
the European contrast. Thus, in Part III, I modify the "atmosphere"
perspective attributable to Europe and argue that sexual harassment
could profitably be reconceived as detrimental workplace condi-
tions. Accordingly, a role for regulation and other extrajudicial
strategies becomes evident. Once seen as detrimental workplace
conditions, sexual harassment could still be remedied with litigation.
' See infra text accompanying notes 348-54.
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The additional perspective should enrich rather than supplant
current American approaches.
Finally, I counsel caution. Part III and the Conclusion discuss
various detriments as well as benefits of a comparative-law synthesis.
But the endeavor offers promise. Using sexual harassment
heuristically, I am writing in support of a new kind of comparative
law that seeks not unified improvement but an enhanced plural-
ism.
26
I. FROM WEST TO EAST: AMERICAN INITIATIVE
Americans first named the problem of sexual harassment. In
translation, this label has become known around the world. Almost
simultaneously, Americans devised or refined key legal concepts to
combat the problem: hostile-environment harassment, sexual
harassment as sex discrimination, and sexual harassment as tortious
conduct. 27 These innovations have stimulated change in Europe:
all three concepts have achieved partial acceptance there, as I detail
in this Part.
A. Naming and Recognizing Sexual Harassment
Linguistic advance was necessary to frame this problem.28 The
world followed an American lead: all foreign-language versions of
this phrase are translations of American English-or, like the
Japanese "seku hara,"29 transliterations. The translation of "harass-
ment" is often imprecise, perhaps because of the strongly American
connotations of freedom and incursion that this word contains.
30
6 An extensive tradition favors pluralism, in contrast to a unitary state-centered
model, as an approach to legal ordering. See ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT
LAW: How NEIGHBORS SETTLE DISPUTES 4-6 (1991); PHILIPPE NONET & PHILLIP
SELZNIK, LAW AND SOCIETY IN TRANSISTION: TOWARD RESPONSIVE LAW 73-113 (1978)
(discussing the need for a "responsive law" that adjusts to and takes into account
diverse forces); JOSEPH V. REES, REFORMING THE WORKPLACE: A STUDY OF SELF-
REGULATION IN OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY 7-8 (1988) (advocating scholarly tradition of
legal pluralism over state-centered legal positivism). Joseph Rees traces this tradition
to Grotius, and includes within it Lon Fuller and other theorists antagonistic to legal
positivism. See REES, supra, at 7 & n.16.2 See infra part I.B.
28 But see EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 26-27 (arguing that common-law terminology
covers the same ground).
' See Anne B. Fisher,Japanese Working Women StrikeBack, FORTUNE, May 31, 1993,
at 22.
"0 Cynthia Grant Bowman argues that one form of sexual harassment, street
harassment, is fundamentally about freedom, in the Lockean, liberal-democratic sense
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The closest equivalent of "harassment" in another language is the
French harclement;31 the German beldstigung,"
2 Spanish acoso,s3
Dutch intimidatie,34 and Italian molestia,"5 for examples, are all not
quite the same as harassment.
Immediately after the phrase was coined in America, its legal
development began. In one landmark case, a federal court held that
propositions followed by retaliation against a woman employee
constituted sex discrimination. 6  In 1980, while the concept of
sexual harassment was only beginning to be known in the United
States and was unacknowledged elsewhere, the United States Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission promulgated rules that
prohibited sexual harassment in the workplace. 37  These rules
included an ambitious definition of sexual harassment that included
both coercion or abuse of power by a supervisor (generally known
as "quid pro quo" harassment) and conduct that creates a hostile
working environment."
In the ensuing years, American courts paid great attention to the
task of naming and recognizing sexual harassment. Commentators
that informed the creation of the United States. See Cynthia G. Bowman, Street
Harassment and the Informal Ghettoization of Women, 106 HARV. L. REV. 517, 520
(1993).
"[Hlarassing." COLLINS-ROBERT FRENCH-ENGLISH ENGLISH-FRENCH DICTIONARY
207 (2d ed. 1993).
'2 "[B]urden, annoyance, nuisance, bother." CASSELL'S ENGLISH AND GERMAN
DICTIONARY 67 (1965).
" "[H]ounding, harassing; relentless questioning." COLLINS SPANISH-ENGLISH
ENGLiSH-SPANISH DICTIONARY 12 (3d ed. 1993).
' "Intimidation." CASSELL'S ENGLISH-DUTCH DUTCH-ENGLISH DICTIONARY 260
(1967).
" "[A]nnoyance, worry, trouble, bother." COLLINS-SANSONI ITALIAN DICTIONARY
1826 (1988).
' See Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654,657 (D.D.C. 1976), rev'd on other grounds
sub nom. Williams v. Bell, 587 F.2d 1240 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
57See Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Guidelines on Discrimination
Because of Sex, 45 Fed. Reg. 74,677 (1980) (codified at 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a)-(g)
(1993)) [hereinafter Guidelines].
" "Unwelcome sexual advances, requests for sexual favors, and other verbal or
physical conduct of a sexual nature constitute sexual harassment when (1) submission
to such conduct is made either explicitly or implicitly a term or condition of an
individual's employment, (2) submission to or rejection of such conduct by an
individual is used as the basis for employment decisions affecting such individual, or
(3) such conduct has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment." 29 C.F.R. § 1604.11(a) (1993).
MacKinnon's book, published a year earlier, identified "quid pro quo" and
"condition of work" as the two types of sexual harassment that occur in the
workplace. MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 32, 40.
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have criticized the federal cases for their various shortcomings;
39
but especially when compared to the law of the rest of the world,
American case law reveals considerable progress over a short span
of time. The Supreme Court agreed with the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission that sexual harassment was actionable
under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act.4" Courts agreed with
the EEOC that corporate employers could be vicariously liable for
the harassment of subordinates by supervisors.4 Appellate courts,
even before the 1980 Guidelines were issued, overturned decisions
that had refused to apply Title VII to claims of harassment.
42
Other courts held that complainants had a claim for sexual
harassment against their corporate employers even where the
harassment was indirect, that is, where the employer required
female employees to dress provocatively, so that they were subject
to sexual harassment from customers or passersby;43 and where a
plaintiff alleged that she was denied promotions and pay increases
because she refused to participate in the custom of quasi-consensual
unions between female subordinates and male supervisors that
prevailed in her office.
44
In 1991, other landmarks appeared. Amendments to Title VII
authorized an expansion of the damages that plaintiffs could receive
39 See, e.g., MARY BECKER ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEMINIST JURISPRU-
DENCE: TAKING WOMEN SERIOUSLY 764-67 (1994) (summarizing commentary on
judicial attempts to create an objective approach to hostile environment claims);
Kathryn Abrams, Gender Discrimination and the Transformation of Workplace Norms, 42
VAND. L. REV. 1183, 1199-202 (1989) (detailing how courts have increased plaintiffs'
burdens and refused to recognize certain harms); Pollack, supra note 2, at 55-69
(criticizing sexual harassment cases and discussing judicial doubt that sexual
harassment is a serious evil).
40 See Meritor Sav. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 73 (1986).
4' See Baker v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 903 F.2d 1342, 1347 (10th Cir. 1990); Waltman
v. Int'l Paper Co., 875 F.2d 468, 479 (5th Cir. 1989); Barrett v. Omaha Nat'l Bank,
726 F.2d 424, 427 (8th Cir. 1984).
42 See, e.g., Tomkins v. Public Sdrv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J.
1976) (construing Title VII as "not intended" to provide remedy for sexually
motivated harassment), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044 (3d Cir. 1977); Corne v. Bausch & Lomb,
Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975) (finding hostile-environment harassment
a mere "personal proclivity, peculiarity, or mannerism"), vacated without opinion, 562
F.2d 55 (9th Cir. 1977); Barnes v. Train, 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 123, 124
(D.D.C. 1974) (finding claim of quid pro quo harassment "not encompassed" by Title
VII), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
"- See EEOC v. Newtown Inn Assocs., 647 F. Supp. 957, 958 (E.D. Va. 1986);
Marentette v. Michigan Host, Inc., 506 F. Supp. 909, 911-12 (E.D. Mich. 1980).
" See Broderick v. Ruder, 685 F. Supp. 1269, 1278-79 (D.D.C. 1988). This case
was settled on terms that appear unusually favorable to the plaintiff. See infra note
250.
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in sex discrimination cases.45 The Ninth Circuit issued the first
detailed holding that claims of sexual harassment brought under
Title VII were to be evaluated in light of what a reasonable woman
would think of the conduct or conditions.4 6 Another court issued
an opinion detailing the harm of sexual harassment, using summa-
ries of expert psychological testimony.4 7 A picture of inexorable
progress is, of course, not warranted. For instance, one government
study showed that sexual harassment of working women did not
decrease in the 1980s.4" However, public attention to the subject
grew dramatically.
While many of these developments were taking place in the
United States, sexual harassment remained a foreign notion in
Europe. In 1983, according to Michael Rubenstein, an important
European contributor to the field, the idea that workplace sexual
harassment could form the basis for a sex discrimination claim was
in Europe "merely an academic hypothesis."4" In 1986, Rubenstein
undertook a survey of European laws on a country-by-country basis
at the behest of the Commission of the European Communities (the
"Commission")." He found virtually no case law and very little
45 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(b)(1)-(3), 105 Stat. 1071,
1073 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(k) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992)) (expanding recovery
to include punitive damages and compensatory damages for "future pecuniary losses,
emotional pain, suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other non-pecuniary losses").
46 See Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991). Other circuits had
adopted a reasonable woman standard before Ellison. See Andrews v. City of
Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1482 (3d Cir. 1990); Yates v. Avco Corp., 819 F.2d 630,
637 (6th Cir. 1987). Because of its full treatment of this question, however, Ellison
has become a landmark.4 See Robinson v. Jacksonville Shipyards, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 1486, 1502-07 (M.D.
Fla. 1991).
48 See U.S. MERIT Sys. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE FEDERAL
GOVERNMENT: AN UPDATE 2 (1988) [hereinafter UPDATE] (comparing 1980 and 1987
percentages of women who reported that they had been harassed); see also Louise F.
Fitzgerald, Science vs. Myth: The Failure of Reason in the Clarence Thomas Hearings, 65
S. CAL. L. REV. 1399, 1400-01 (1992) (summarizing 1980s data on the prevalence of
sexual harassment).
41 Michael Rubenstein, Sexual Harassment: European Commission Recommendation
and Code of Practice, 21 INDUS. L.J. 70, 70 (1992) [hereinafter Rubenstein, Recommenda-
tion] (citing Michael Rubenstein, The Law of Sexual Harassment at Work, 12 INDUS. L.J.
1 (1983)). In Canada, however, sexual harassment was equated with sex discrimina-
tion at about the same time as in the United States, in a 1980 case known as Cherie
Bell. Bell v. Ladas & The Flaming Steer Steak House & Tavern, Inc. 1 C.H.R.R.
D/155 (Ont. Bd. of Inquiry 1980). See ARJUN P. AGGARWAL, SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE WORKPLACE 23-24 (1987) (discussing Cherie Bell and its holding that sexual
harassment constitutes sex discrimination).
o The Commission is the administrative sector of the European Community. See
1994] 1237
1238 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1227
empirical research, trade union engagement, or other evidence of
initiative relating to sexual harassment.5 1 Although sex discrimina-
tion in employment had been outlawed by a fully-implemented 1976
directive,5 2 no member state had used its implementing statute as
a basis for combating sexual harassment.-
3
As Europe began to face this issue on a Community level in the
1980s, it adopted a series of measures, lagging behind concurrent
developments in America. A 1984 Council Resolution alluded to
sexual harassment as a major problem affecting the dignity and
rights of women,54 several years after the United States' EEOC had
made the same acknowledgment, and promulgated rules to fight the
problem. The next important step in the Community, after the
Commission received and published the Rubenstein report,5 5 was
the 1990 Council Resolution on the Protection of the Dignity of
Women and Men at Work.5" Borrowing the American-derived pair
of concepts, quid pro quo and hostile working environment, this
resolution marked the first time a Community document had
provided any description of sexual harassment.
5 7
The Council resolution called on the Commission to draw up a
code on workplace sexual harassment during 1991.58 A code was
duly prepared, and the Commission decided to attach it to an
official recommendation, to enhance its status. 9 Called the Code
TREATY ESTABLISHING THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY [EEC TREATY] art. 155.
Rubenstein recalls that Community officials did not use the term sexual harassment
in their request. Telephone Interview with Michael Rubenstein, Consultant to the
European Commission (Dec. 1, 1992).
5' See MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, THE DIGNITY OF WOMEN AT WORK: A REPORT ON
THE PROBLEM OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE MEMBER STATES OF THE EUROPEAN
COMMUNITIES app., at 107-64 (1988).
"2 See Council Directive 76/207, 1976 O.J. (L 39) 40 [hereinafter Equal Treatment
Directive] (decreeing"the principle of equal treatment for men and women as regards
access to employment, vocational training and promotion, and working conditions").
A directive is a Community law that announces an objective to be achieved within a
stated period; the member states must adjust their own laws, usually with implement-
ing statutes, to be consistent with this objective. See EEC TREATY art. 189.
53 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 25.
" See Council Recommendation on the Promotion of Positive Action for Women,
1984 O.J. (L 331) 34. The Council is the legislative body in the Community with the
broadest lawmaking power. The other major legislature, the Assembly or Parliament,
has a narrower role. See EEC TREATY arts. 137-53 (describing the powers of the
Parliament and Council respectively).
5 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51.
5 1990 OJ. (C 157) 3 [hereinafter 1990 Resolution].
5 7 See Rubenstein, Recommendation, supra note 49, at 71. But as Rubenstein points
out, this resolution never uses the term sexual harassment. See id.
' See 1990 Resolution, supra note 56, at 4.
'9 See Commission Recommendation of 27 November 1991 on the Protection of
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of Practice, this annex set forth guidance on sexual harassment-
what it means, what steps should be taken to prevent it, and how
remedies should be provided-aimed at employers, employees, and
trade unions.6" An official commentary on the Code of Practice,
released inJune 1993, contains examples of sexual harassment and
a list of relevant initiatives in member states.
61
Although the Code of Practice offers great potential to unify
and advance European Community law, it also demonstrates the
ways in which EC law remains unequal to that of the United States.
In most EC countries, sexual harassment cannot be the basis for
criminal prosecution or private civil actions for damages.62
Neither the Community-wide law making sex discrimination illegal
nor the Code of Practice contains any mention of sanctions. The
idea that sexual harassment constitutes a legal wrong is not widely
shared in Europe." In sum, naming and recognizing sexual
harassment must be credited to Americans, who have given the
world unequaled leadership in this area.
B. The Formation of Legal Concepts
1. Hostile-Environment Harassment
Although Americans coined the phrases "quid pro quo harass-
ment" and "hostile-environment harassment," both phenomena
began in the Old World. Literary works such as Measure for Measure,
Tosca, Tess of the D'Urbervilles, The Way We Live Now, and Candide,
among many others, demonstrate European familiarity with sexual
the Dignity of Women and Men at Work, 1992 O.J. (L 49) 1 [hereinafter Recommen-
dation and Code]; see also Rubenstein, Recommendation, supra note 49, at 71 (noting
enhancement of status). A Commission recommendation does not bind member
states or their citizens. See EEC TREATY art. 189. National courts within the EC,
however, are obliged to take recommendations into account when deciding disputes
submitted to them. See Case 322/88, Grimaldi v. Fonds des Maladies
Professionnelles, 1989 E.C.R. 4407, 4421 (discussing the legal effect of Commission
recommendations).
6o For a more complete summary of the Code, see infra text accompanying notes
258, 266-84.
61 See RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 17-32.
62 Sexual harassment, narrowly defined, is a crime in France and Spain. SeeJamie
Dettmer & Susan Ellicott, Hearings Spark Debate on Meaning of Harassment, THE TIMES,
Oct. 15, 1991, at 11. For a discussion of the French statute, see infra note 127.
Sexual harassment has been the basis of civil litigation in EC countries, notably
Britain, Ireland, and Denmark. See infra text accompanying notes 83-88.
' See Riding, supra note 9, at 1, 7.
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blackmail and coercion.' Hostile-environment harassment is also
traceable to Europe; the historian Lin Farley connects it to the
English industrial revolution. According to Farley, child-labor laws
(which created a child care problem), combined with competition
among factory workers for employment, led men to believe that
women ought to be kept out of the workplace unless they were
needed for work that men did not want.6" Protective legislation,
the rise of trade unions, disquisitions on the frail biology of women,
and hostile-environment sexual harassment were all the direct
results of this belief.6 6 In this light, hostile-environment harass-
ment is visible as a longstanding phenomenon with a relatively new
American name.
Hostile-environment theory was introduced to American case
law in a context distinct from sexual harassment. It originated in a
challenge to the practice of segregating patients in an optometrist's
office on the basis of their national origin and ethnicity.6 7 The
plaintiff, a Spanish-surnamed worker in the office, claimed that this
practice was offensive and a violation of Title VII. The Fifth Circuit
agreed, condemning work environments that are "heavily charged
with discrimination," even where a challenged practice is not aimed
directly at the employee. 8 Sexual harassment claims based on this
theory began to be brought in the late 1970s, with the first successes
occurring in 1980 and 1981, around the time of the EEOC Guide-
lines.69 Hostile-environment sexual harassment received recogni-
tion by the Supreme Court in 1986. °
6 See THOMAS HARDY, TESS OFTHE D'URBERVILLES 377,390 (Bantam Books 1984)
(1891); WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, MEASURE FOR MEASURE act 2, sc. 4; TOSCA act 2 (Luigi
Illica & Giuseppe Giacosa libretto, first performed 1900); 2 ANTHONY TROLLOPE, THE
WAY WE LIVE Now 197-98 (Mod. Lib. 1984) (1876); VOLTAIRE, CANDIDE 14-16, 57
(Robert M. Adams trans., 2d ed., 1991) (1759); see also Jane E. Larson, "Women
Understand So Little, They Call My Good Nature 'Deceit": A Feminist Rethinking of
Seduction, 93 COLUM. L. REV. 374, 375-79 (1993) (discussing the theme of sexual
coercion in nineteenth-century novels and opera libretti).
65 
See LIN FARLEY, SEXUAL SHAKEDOWN: THE SEXUAL HARASSMENT OF WOMEN ON
THE JOB 29-30 (1978).
6 See id. at 29-40.
61 See Rogers v. EEOC, 454 F.2d 234, 237 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 957
(1972).
rId. at 239.
61 See Brown v. City of Guthrie, 22 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1627, 1631 (W.D.
Okla. 1980); see also Bundy v.Jackson, 641 F.2d 934, 943 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (first appel-
late court opinion).
7' See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 63-68 (1986).
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As American law defines the problem, this type of sexual
harassment consists of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct of a
sexual nature that has the purpose or effect of creating a hostile
working environment.71 The definition recognizes several charac-
teristics of the sexual references that occur at work. First, they can
be unwelcome. Second, sexual references can cause harm even
when harm is not the offender's purpose, as in quid pro quo
harassment. Third, this conduct, "unreasonably interfering with an
individual's work performance," 2 can ruin what would otherwise
be a tolerable job. According to reformers, this simple American
lesson needs to be learned in Europe. European experts allude to
a common belief that any attempt to prevent or remedy hostile-
environment harassment would import American puritanism and
fear of sex into the continent,"s creating drabness in the place
where the slogan vive la diffirence was born. Flirtation and sensuality
are part of the spice of life, it is said, and concern about hostile-
environment harassment threatens to make life bland.74
European working women, however, report in surveys that the
EEOC Guidelines allude to real problems. When questioned, they
refuse to divide sexual references at work into either blackmail or
harmless, spice-of-life titillation.7" The problem they live with is
seldom the melodrama or literary tragedy of quid pro quo harass-
ment but the hurt of a workplace in which women are treated
contemptuously because they are women.
7 6
71 See Guidelines, supra note 37, § 1604.11(a).
SId.
Telephone Interview with Ineke M. de Vries, Consultant to the Commission on
Sexual Harassment (Apr. 5, 1993); Telephone Interview with Michael Rubenstein,
supra note 50; Interview with Nathalie Wiaume, Equal Opportunities Unit,
Commission of the European Communities, in Brussels, Belgium (Mar. 19, 1993).
7
4 See MICHAEL RUBENSTEIN, PREVENTING AND REMEDYING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
AT WORK 4 (2d ed. 1992); Riding, supra note 9, at 7.
75 See RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 9 (citing finding that 93% of
working women surveyed in Germany report firsthand experience of occurrences
mentioned in questionnaire; 72% had experienced behavior that they or other
working women consider harassment); id. at 12 (citing finding that 96% of women in
"non-traditional" women's occupations in Britain had experienced sexual harassment);
see also id. (citing study by the Women's Institute in Spain finding that 90% of young
women in their first jobs had experienced sexual harassment); Anne T. Goldstein,
Sexual Harassment Continental Style, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 12, 1993, at 19 (Supp.)
(summarizing empirical data about sexual harassment in the EC).
" In both the United States and Europe, the magnitude of hostile-environment
harassment remains underappreciated. One American estimate suggests that quid
pro quo cases account for only five percent of all incidents of sexual harassment, even
though quid pro quo still seems to many the quintessence of harassment. See Daniel
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The ten years between promulgation of the EEOC Guidelines
and official acknowledgment of hostile-environment harassment in
the European Community represent an important period in the
history of sexual harassment law. In this period, American initiative
played a leading role. Virtually alone among the nations of the
world, the law of United States recognized sexual harassment as a
fact of workplace life and sought to devise remedies.
2. Sexual Harassment as Sex Discrimination
This doctrinal innovation, identified with Catharine MacKinnon,
proposes that sexual harassment is a species of wrongful discrimina-
ton and unequal treatment.77  Sex discrimination is explicitly
prohibited by Title VII. Because sexual harassers intimidate and ill-
treat their targets in part because of their sex, it is almost always
true to say that the harm would not have occurred but for the sex
of the target. Accordingly, the victim has suffered a detriment on
the basis of sex-a detriment comparable to unequal pay, for
example. Like the unequally-paid employee, MacKinnon has
argued, this person ought to have a remedy available in Title VII.
78
Over the objections of some American critics, 79 the idea has taken
hold. Courts began accepting the equivalence even before
MacKinnon published its first lengthy explication."0 The Supreme
Goleman, Sexual Harassment: It's About Power, Not Lust, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 22, 1991, at
C1, C12.
7 See MAcKINNON, supra note 1, at 6.
78 See id. at 5-6.79 See EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 357-66; see also Vinson v. Taylor, 760 F.2d 1330,
1333 n.7 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (Bork,J., dissenting) (arguing that Title VII should not be
applied to sexual harassment cases because of the "awkwardness of classifying sexual
advances as 'discrimination'"), affd, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986);
cf. Paul, supra note 21, at 335-36, 359-63 (favoring a tort remedy for sexual harass-
ment). Critics point out that there is no evidence that Congress intended Title VII
to cover sexual harassment; indeed, "sex" was added to the statute at the last minute.
See Paul, supra note 21, at 346. Professor Paul argues that because it is seldom the
case that every woman in a particular workplace experiences sexual harassment, the
law ought to regard it as different from discrimination that burdens all members of
a group, such asJim Crow laws. See id. at 349-50. Several writers have mentioned the
logical problem of the bisexual "equal opportunity" harasser, a point that
MacKinnon's early work did not neglect. See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 200-06.
To some, the equating of sexual harassment with sex discrimination unfairly punishes
the employer, an "almost universally unacknowledged victim." Paul, supra note 21,
at 356; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 363 (arguing that the harassing acts of a
supervisor are miscategorized as acts by the company, since the supervisor acts only
to gain personal pleasure).
80 See MACKINNON, supra note I and accompanying text.
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Court has agreed;"1 and as one critic has noted, sexual harassment
as sex discrimination is now "the dominant view. "82
Harassment-as-discrimination has been partially accepted in
Europe. The influence of this concept outside the United States
first became evident in British case law. According to the leading
case,83 a decision of the Scottish Court of Session, quid pro quo
harassment constitutes "detriment" within the meaning of the
relevant British statute, the Sex Discrimination Act of 1975.84 The
rationale of the case is applicable to hostile environment claims as
well. 5
In a lesser-known but earlier decision, the Labour Court of
Ireland held that sexual harassment is a form of sex discrimination,
stating that "'freedom from sexual harassment is a condition of
work which an employee of either sex is entitled to expect,'" and
"'any denial of that freedom [is] discrimination. ' "86 In a 1989 case,
a woman in Denmark, "relieved of all her duties" by her foreman
who had made sexual advances to her, was awarded 40,000 crowns
as damages. 17 The Supreme Court of Ostre Landsrets found that
this conduct violated the Community-wide prohibition of sex
discrimination.
8 8
These ideas have also taken root in Portugal, where the Comissao
para a Igualdade no Trabalho e no Emprego (Commission on Equality
at Work and in Employment) declared in 1987 that sex discrimina-
tion laws were not applicable to combat sexual harassment at
work.89 Some years later, this commission reversed its position,
81 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 57.
8 EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 351 n.1.
' See Strathclyde Regional Council v. Porcelli, [1986] Sess. Cas. 137.
8 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 74, app. 3, at 46-49 (citing Porcelli, [1986] Sess. Cas.
at 137; Bracebridge Eng'g Ltd. v. Darby, [1990] I.R.L.R. 3; Wileman v. Minilec Eng'g
Ltd., [1988] I.R.L.R. 144; and Balgobin & Another v. London Borough of Tower
Hamlets, [1987] I.R.L.R. 401).
' In Porcelli, the harassers were co-workers, not supervisors. See Porcelli, [1986]
Sess. Cas. at 137. For a discussion of this case, see Nicolle R. Lipper, Comment,
Sexual Harassment in the Workplace: A Comparative Study of Great Britain and the United
States, 13 COMP. LAB. L.J. 293, 317 (1992).
6 RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, app. at 133 (quoting A Worker v. A Garage
Proprietor, Labour Court 1985).
87 At 1989 exchange rates, this amount was equivalent to about 6000 U.S. dollars.
See International Monetaiy Fund, 42 INT'L FIN. STAT. 193 (1989). The award is sizeable
by European standards. See infra note 112.
8 See RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 28 (citingJudgment of Sept. 8,
1989, Supreme Court of Ostre Landsrets).89 See International Labour Office, supra note 19, at 138.
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and Portuguese authorities now accept the principle of harassment-
as-discrimination." One writer has attributed this reversal to
Commission reports which had contended that, in the absence of
sexual harassment legislation, sex discrimination laws could and
should be used for this purpose. 1 In its administrative decision,
the government of Portugal reacted to the American equating of
discrimination with harassment and accepted the American-
originated idea that sexual harassment is a practical, urgent problem
requiring a solution.
A similar reaction to the idea of harassment-as-discrimination
occurred at the Community level while the Code of Practice was
being prepared. Some reformers sought to promulgate a sexual
harassment directive (a directive being a stronger measure than the
recommendation that was ultimately produced) 2 on the grounds
that existing legal remedies were inadequate and that few initiatives
had been undertaken at the national level.9 3 In declining to
prepare a directive, the Commission contended that the measure
would be superfluous because sexual harassment is contrary to the
Community-wide law against sex discrimination.94 As in the case
of Portugal, the Commission first ignored or rejected the asserted
equivalence of harassment with discrimination and then in effect
reversed itself, seeing possibilities in the idea.
The potentially important implications of the Commission
pronouncement may be expressed as a syllogism: If sex discrimina-
tion is unlawful everywhere in the Community, and sexual harass-
ment is a form of sex discrimination, then sexual harassment is
unlawful everywhere in the Community. Since the EC sex discrimi-
nation law has no sanctions attached, however, the power of this
proclamation remains dormant.
3. Sexual Harassment as Tortious Conduct
More than any other country, the United States associates
individual rights with private-law remedies.95 American courts
have offered a response to sexual harassment grounded in various
90 See id.
91 See id.
92 See supra notes 52, 59.
" See Rubenstein, Recommendation, supra note 49, at 70.
94 See id.
" See MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL
DISCOURSE 161-62 (1991).
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torts: intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of
privacy, assault, battery, even false imprisonment. The array of
private-law remedies available-at least in theory-is wider in the
United States than anywhere else. Moreover, a new common-law
tort of sexual harassment is percolating in American scholarship.Y
6
Because American tort law has always been receptive to innovations
proposed in academic writing, experience suggests that this new tort
has reasonable prospects for judicial acceptance." The American
expression of individual rights through tort law has been, and will
continue to be, influential in other countries.
a. Dignitary Torts
Although dignitary torts have a venerable pedigree in Europe,98
they are especially important and numerous in American law.
Victims of sexual harassment can choose from several of these torts
in an effort to win full monetary damages and, perhaps, to impose
a stigma on individual harassers. 9  Some of these torts-battery,
See infra note 114.
9 7The most famous instance of such initiative is the tort of invasion of privacy,
proposed by Louis Brandeis, who was later to become ajustice of the Supreme Court,
and Samuel Warren, who was annoyed by the intrusion of reporters at a wedding.
See Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right of Privacy, 4 HARv. L. REV. 193
(1890); see also Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Freedom
of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629, 632 (1943) (arguing that the standard consumer
contract is coercive, thereby establishing an intellectual basis for enterprise liability);
Naomi Sheiner, Comment, DES and a Proposed Theoty of Enterprise Liability, 46
FOp.DHAm L. REV. 963 (1978) (proposing a market-share approach to the causation
problem in toxic torts).
98 See e.g., BflRCERUCHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] § 825 (F.R.G.) (providing that "(a]
person who by cunning, by threats, or by the abuse of a relationship of dependence,
induces a woman to permit extra-marital cohabitation" is liable to compensate her for
injury); I. de S. et ux. v. W. de S., Y.B., 22 Edw. 3, fol. 99, pl. 60 (1348) (allowing
cause of action for assault).
' In addition to dignitary torts, some American states recognize a tort of wrongful
discharge, which could be applied when the harassed plaintiff's employment was
actually or constructively terminated. See Hale v. Ladd, 826 S.W.2d 244, 245-46 (Ark.
1992) (allowing a cause of action for wrongful discharge when the plaintiff was
dismissed after rebuffing the defendant employer's sexual advances); Foster v.
Albertsons, Inc., 835 P.2d 720, 726-27 (Mont. 1992) (recognizing a cause of action for
retaliatory discharge relating to sexual harassment). In Europe, where workers' rights
enjoy greater protection, wrongful discharge law is a more important weapon against
sexual harassment. See, e.g., International Labour Office, supra note 19, at 91, 97,
103, 106, 113, 125, 138, and 144 (describing the use of unjust dismissal law for sexual
harassment cases in Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the Netherlands,
Spain, and Portugal). Another non-dignitary tort possibility, rarely used in sexual
harassment cases, is tortious interference with contract. See Kyriazi v. Western Elec.
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assault, false imprisonment-are not particular to the United States,
but have been used most extensively there. Other causes of action-
invasion of privacy and intentional infliction of emotional distress-
are American innovations.
When sexual harassers touch their victims in a harmful or
offensive manner, claims of battery may arise. American courts
have accepted battery as a proper theory of recovery in sexual
harassment cases, particularly those involving sexual touching."
°
Assault, where the plaintiff must prove that she perceived an
imminent harmful or offensive contact, is also used in sexual
harassment cases, although in American practice never without
another tort, usually battery.10 A California court found one
defendant-harasser liable for false imprisonment: he had clamped
the plaintiff, a waitress who worked in his restaurant, between his
legs, refusing to release her.
10 2
American courts have also deemed invasion of privacy and
intentional infliction of emotional distress to be tortious conduct.
Both of these torts are recognized in the Restatement and in most
states. They may be deemed American-created in that they are
framed more precisely, and are more frequently invoked, than are
foreign civil-code references to violation of the rights of the person-
Co., 476 F. Supp. 335, 336 (D.N.J. 1979) (noting that the harassment suffered by
plaintiff interfered with her ability to fulfill contractual responsibilities). The most
creative suggestion of all comes from Professor Bowman, who suggests that the
"prima facie tort"-a seldom-used catchall covering any intentional and unjustified yet
lawful act-could be deployed in sexual harassment cases. See Bowman, supra note 30,
at 573 n.293.
100 See Pease v. Alford Photo Indus., Inc., 667 F. Supp. 1188, 1203 (W.D. Tenn.
1987); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 586 (Ariz. 1987); Byrd v. Richardson-
Greenshields Sec., Inc. 552 So. 2d 1099, 1104 (Fla. 1989); Greenland v. Fairtron
Corp., 500 N.W.2d 36, 39 (Iowa 1993).
101 In Britain, however, which does not recognize independent (i.e., nonparasitic)
causes of action for emotional harm, one attorney used assault creatively as the legal
basis for a sexual harassment claim. The plaintiff in this case contended that the
defendant's loud, violent threats put her in imminent apprehension of a battery. The
High Court allowed this claim of assault, rejecting the defendant's assertion that the
case was one of employment discrimination and, therefore, had to be heard in the
Industrial Tribunal, where damages would have been capped at £10,000. Because the
assault claim was permitted to reach the High Court, where damages are unlimited,
the plaintiff was able to obtain a favorable settlement: £25,000 and the right to speak
freely about the case. Telephone Interview with Denise Kingsmill, Solicitor (Apr. 14,
1993). After the settlement, the European Court ofJustice struck down this cap on
damages as violative of the Equal Treatment Directive. See Marshall v. Southampton
& South West Hampshire Area Health Auth., 3 W.L.R. 1054, 1091 (E.C.J. 1993).
'02 See Priest v. Rotary, 634 F. Supp. 571, 583-84 (N.D. Cal. 1986).
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ality."'0 Common-law jurisdictions other than the United States
have not produced such innovations.
The subdivision of invasion of privacy that applies to sexual
harassment is intrusion upon seclusion, an encroachment into
private affairs that would be highly offensive to a reasonable
person. 10 4  Sexual harassment plaintiffs have had mixed results
with this cause of action: some courts appear eager to constrain it,
often limiting it to intrusion into physical space.'05 Other courts
have used the tort more liberally. In one case, a plaintiff alleged
that her supervisor had called her repeatedly at home to make
sexual advances; the court, ruling on a motion to dismiss, held that
this contention stated a cause of action for invasion of privacy."0 6
Going further, the Alabama Supreme Court has alluded to the
plaintiffs "emotional sanctum," invaded when an employer
repeatedly pestered an employee with demands for sex and
questions about the sex life she shared with her husband." 7 The
court permitted the claim for intrusion. °'
Intentional infliction of emotional distress is the major theory
of redress in tort cases alleging sexual harassment. Using this tort,
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant intentionally or
recklessly engaged in extreme and outrageous conduct that caused
her severe emotional distress."0 9 To many judges and observers,
this is the tort that best fits the actual experience and injury of
sexual harassment, although the technical requirements of other
torts might be met as well."0 Judicial opinions ruling in favor of
103 For a comparative summary, see Pierre-Dominique Oilier &Jean-Pierre Le Gall,
Various Damages, in 11 INTERNATIONAL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF COMPARATIVE LAW ch. 10,
§§ 70-75 (Andr6 Tunc ed., 1986). Ollier and Le Gall point out that, in general, civil-
law countries protect dignitary interests through their criminal law, and even in
common-law countries, few legal systems permit separate actions for injury to feelings
and mental suffering. See id. §§ 70-72 & n.531.104 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1976).
o See Krista J. Schoenheider, Comment, A Theory of Tort Liability for Sexual
Harassment in the Workplace, 134 U. PA. L. REV. 1461, 1478 (1986). Schoenheider
discusses Cummings v. Walsh Constr. Co., 561 F. Supp. 872 (S.D. Ga. 1983), as an
example of this fearful tendency. See Schoenheider, supra, at 478. In addition to
asserting that the intrusion-upon-seclusion tort ought to be confined to "physical
areas," the court denied plaintiff's claim on the ground that, having submitted to her
supervisor's advances, she "waived whatever right to privacy she had as to her
personal seclusion or solitude." Cummings, 561 F. Supp. at 884.
'o See Rogers v. Loews L'Enfant Plaza Hotel, 526 F. Supp. 523, 528 (D.D.C. 1981).
107 Phillips v. Smalley Maintenance Servs., Inc., 435 So. 2d 705, 711 (Ala. 1983).
's See id. (rejecting the argument that a finding of liability hinges upon whether
or not the defendant violated the plaintiff's physical, as opposed to emotional, space).
'
09 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 46 (1976).
"0 See Barbara E. Hadsell, Maximizing Damages Recovery in a Sexual Harassment
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plaintiffs emphasize the extreme and outrageous conduct of
defendants and the great emotional suffering of plaintiffs."'
Using both traditional common-law concepts and newer torts,
then, American judges have helped to shape the idea that sexual
harassment is an invasion against the person, a physical and
emotional injury for which money damages are appropriate. Tort
concepts acknowledge the physical integrity of a worker, the
existence of an emotional sanctum that deserves respect, and the
right to be free from outrageous mistreatment. Combined with
American rules that permit very high compensatory awards,
burdensome discovery, jury trials, and punitive damages, these tort
concepts warn potential offenders that they violate the sanctity of
a person at great peril. No other country in the world has put so
high a price on sexual harassment. 112  Although Europe has
declined to emulate this potential for a steep penalty, it has been
impressed with the seriousness that this American penalty repre-
sents. 1
3
b. The Nascent Tort of Sexual Harassment
Several American writers wish to see the courts create a new
common-law or statutory tort of sexual harassment." 4  Others,
making a similar argument, urge that common-law tort paradigms
rather than employment discrimination law govern the problem of
Case, 17 A.L.I.-A.B.A. COURSE MATERIALS J. 7, 8 (1992) (noting that while sexual
harassment may be actionable under a variety of tort theories, recovery is most often
sought for emotional harm).
'" See Poff v. Oak Tree Mortgage Corp., 61 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1562,
1564 (E.D. La. 1993); Godfrey v. Perkin-Elmer Corp., 794 F. Supp. 1179, 1189
(D.N.H. 1992); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 585 (Ariz. 1987); Linebaugh v.
Sheraton Michigan Corp., 497 N.W.2d 585, 588-89 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993).
112 Consider that until recently in Britain, the EC country with the most American-
like sexual harassment law, the forum for sexual harassment cases permitted awards
of only up to £10,000 (about 15,000 U.S. dollars), and this maximum was seldom
approached. The £25,000 settlement discussed above at note 101 is almost legendary
in England and the European Community. I know of no large awards or settlements
in wealthy EC countries such as Germany, Italy, and France. Cf. AGGARWAL, supra
note 49, at 170 (quoting from two cases where awards of 2500 Canadian dollars were
justified by elaborate references to the plaintiffs' extreme suffering). Sexual
harassment claims have enriched very few American litigants, but awards and
settlements run much higher in the United States than in Europe.
11 See infra note 127 and accompanying text.
114 The principal contributors are Paul, supra note 21; Schoenheider, supra note
105; and Michael D. Vhay, The Harms of Asking Towards a Comprehensive Treatment
of Sexual Harassment, 55 U. CHI. L. REV. 328 (1988).
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workplace sexual harassment.1 5 Many of these commentators
offer definitions of sexual harassment and further clarification.
As of this writing, no court has accepted the new tort. The
suggestion is of more than utopian interest, however. By arguing
that sexual harassment violates individual rights, these commenta-
tors keep alive an intellectually useful complement or counterpoint
to the claim that sexual harassment is sex discrimination. Some
writers seek to supplement employment discrimination law with
their new tort while others seek to preclude it. Both approaches
contribute an individual-rights perspective to an area of law where
employment discrimination principles dominate.
One commentator has pointed out the uneasy fit between sexual
harassment and employment discrimination law.l1 ' In addition to
the famous analytical question of the bisexual harasser, who targets
men and women with equal animus or lust, harassment-as-discrimi-
nation raises another, more realistic, problem of logic: unwelcome-
ness. Sexual harassment is the only subcategory of American
federal antidiscrimination law where the victim must prove that the
discrimination was distasteful or unwelcome, and must share her
subjective feelings with the court.'17  As such, it is a Title VII
anomaly. Because of these conceptual failings, Michael Vhay
proposes a comprehensive overhaul of sexual harassment law in
which employment discrimination law would continue to protect
workers from discriminatory harassment." The concept is
especially well suited to hostile environment cases. For situations
involving sexual advances, employment discrimination law works
less well than would a new sexual harassment tort, which would
address overtures made in inappropriate contexts. 9
Other commentators see sexual harassment as an injury to be
found within the domain of tort law. Krista Schoenheider argues
for a new tort that would free plaintiffs from the burdens of
establishing prima facie cases of battery, invasion of privacy, or
n5 The leading exponents of this view arejudge Robert Bork and Richard Epstein.
See supra note 79.
" See Vhay, supra note 114, at 337-53.
17 See id. at 347-48.
"s See id. at 356-60.
19 See id. Vhay adds a third category: advances that are so outrageous that they
ought to be actionable no matter what the context. See id. at 360-62. To remedy this
evil, he argues for vigorous use of the existing tort of intentional infliction of
emotional distress. See id.
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intentional infliction of emotional distress. 20  Her expansive
approach is countered by Ellen Frankel Paul, the leading critic of
harassment-as-discrimination, who has proposed a new tort that
would have the effect of limiting the actionability of workplace
sexual harassment.121 Because harassment-as-discrimination is a
"defective paradigm," Paul argues, it ought to be supplanted by a
new tort for sexual harassment. 122 Patterned after the Restate-
ment version of the tort of intentional infliction of emotional dis-
tress, 23 her tort imposes stringent proof requirements on a plain-
tiff.124  It is not clear whether this proposal gives victims any
remedies that they do not already have under the widely-available
emotional distress tort. As Paul points out, however, the creation
of a new tort would send a strong message that society condemns
sexual harassment. 125
This point may be applied to the new-tort academic literature
itself. Authors considering how best to fashion a sexual harassment
tort bring together the individual rights theme expressed in
dignitary tort law and the insight that sexual harassment is, or can
be, employment discrimination. Paul, Schoenheider, and especially
Vhay have unpacked workplace sexual harassment law to reveal its
struggle between the two traditions.
26
Whether or not American courts will accept some version of a
new common-law tort, it is unlikely that another country will borrow
the idea for itself; outside the United States, the influence of this
academic writing is conceptual. But the conceptual message
nonetheless carries power. In the United States, when any behavior
is said to warrant its own tort, that behavior has received a deep
stigma that can be exceeded only by criminalization. 127  The
120 See Schoenheider, supra note 105, at 1485-94.
221 See Paul, supra note 21, at 359-63.
122 Id. at 336-59.
122 See id. at 361.
124 Hostile-environment harassment must be "persistent" and, in the eyes of "a
reasonable person," "extreme and outrageous." Id. at 362. The harasser must have
acted intentionally or recklessly and the victim must have suffered "economic
detriment and/or extreme emotional distress." Id.
125 See id. at 363.
126 See generally Vhay, supra note 114, at 353-55 (arguing that "sexual harassment"
encompasses several discrete wrongs and that aggregating these wrongs has led to
confusion and misunderstanding).
127 It is probable that American opprobrium expressed in new-tort writing
influenced, or was at least related to, the recent creation of a criminal law against
sexual harassment in France. See Code Penal [C. PaN.] art. 222-32-1 (Fr.) (applying
only to harassment aimed at obtaining favors of a sexual nature-that is, quid pro quo
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nascent tort is an idea not only of intellectual vitality but subtle
practical consequences as well.
II. FROM EAST TO WEST: EUROPEAN SKEPTICISM
Rights-consciousness and tort law have a long tradition in the
member nations of the EC, but as methods for redressing sexual
harassment, they appear radical and excessive to some European
observers. A widely held view in the Community is that sexual
harassment amounts to less of a problem than Americans make of
it.12 Another widely held view-about which there is even more
consensus-is that American devices, including legal doctrine,
designed to respond to claims of sexual harassment may be
inappropriate for Europe.
129
Beginning with the premise that European nations and the EC
take sexual harassment seriously, this Part of the Article addresses
the latter kind of skepticism by discussing in turn some of the
doubts expressed in the Community about American-style approach-
es to sexual harassment. In calling this skepticism "European," I
merge several entities, including Community decisionmakers, the
laws, customs, and institutions of member states, and public
opinion. Although they are distinct, these entities have a common
perspective: all have shared in the reaction to American initiatives
in remedying sexual harassment.
A. Community Law: Jurisdictional Doubt
1. The Objection Identified
Opponents of Community-wide sexual harassment legislation
have brought a wide range of arguments to the debate in Europe.
Of these arguments, jurisdictional doubt is the one most pertinent
to American observers.
harassment); see also International Labour Office, supra note 19, at 97 (attributing
increased interest in this problem in France to developments in Canada, the United
States, and the European Community).
128 See Riding, supra note 9, at I (describing European legislators' and officials'
reluctance "to go too far toward ... American excesses" and alluding to "the
desexualization of the United States").
1" See, e.g., id. (noting the views of a French government official).
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a. The Principle of Specific Attribution of Powers
Because the European Community is a federal supragovernment
of limited powers, its lawmaking must be justified with reference to
foundational principles. No general power enables the Community
to carry out tasks that lie outside the objectives stated in the
founding treaties.3 0 These treaties contain scant mention of
human rights, let alone feminism, and express no commitment to
protecting human rights or individual freedom13 1-an omission
that creates jurisdictional difficulty for lawmakers seeking to
advance the equality of the sexes in the Community.
These lawmakers have built a stance, if not quite ajurisdictional
basis, to support Community involvement in equal opportunity for
men and women. EC institutions have formally affirmed the dignity
of women at work. The European Parliament has issued a resolu-
tion decrying "violence against women," using the word "violence"
in its French-feminist sense to include several types of oppression,
including workplace harassment.13 2  Later, Parliament issued
another resolution, more to the point, on the protection of the
dignity of women at work."'3 The Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers, adopted at the Strasbourg
European Council (a gathering of the heads of state and govern-
ment of eleven member nations), urged in 1989 that "action should
be intensified" to promote workplace equality."3 Although the
EEC Treaty remains unamended, all the major elected EC institu-
tions have thus asserted a commitment to women's rights, thereby
giving this- cause a measure of democratic legitimacy that supports
the work of the unelected Commission.
For its part, the Commission has proclaimed a series of medium-
term action programs to promote equal opportunities for women
and men.3 5 Focusing primarily, although not exclusively, on the
130 See KLAuS-DIETER BORCHARDT, THE ABC OF COMMUNITY LAw 8 (3d ed. 1991).
131 See id. at 12. The European Court of Justice has declared with increasing
frequency, however, that Community citizens enjoy unenumerated fundamental
rights. See, e.g., Case 12/86, Demirel v. Stadt Schwfbisch Gmfind, 1987 E.C.R. 3719,
3754 (citing Convention on Human Rights); Case 130/75, Prais v. Council of the
European Communities, 1976 E.C.R. 1589, 1589 (recognizing plaintiff's right to
freedom of religion in her search for employment with the Community).
132 1986 O.J. (C 176) 73-83.
113 See 1991 O.J. (C 305) 14-15.
1'4 Council Resolution, 1991 O.J. (C 142) 1 (citing Community Charter of the
Fundamental Social Rights of Workers).
" See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMMUNITY LAW AND
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workplace, these measures strive to make meaningful the protec-
tions of prior Community legislation and to build support for new
laws. The jurisdictional basis of these initiatives is the EEC Treaty
provision that Community institutions are empowered to carry out
the objectives of the Community where the Treaty does not confer
the necessary specific powers for this purpose. 8
The only textual reference to equality of the sexes in the
founding treaties, however, concerns equal pay for men and
women.137  How much reform can this provision support? The
Community has used the equal pay article to buttress new legislation
expanding the rights of women in the workplace, but this expansion
has achieved only limited results. The first new directive, promul-
gated in 1975, stuck closely to the language of the EEC Treaty.'
Elaborating on the principle of equal pay, this directive prohibited
any pay discrimination based on sex, ordered that all job classifi-
cations be egalitarian, and decreed that all provisions contrary to
the principle be deleted from collective bargaining agreements and
individual employment contracts.'39 A year later came a directive
on equal treatment;4 this measure strayed further from the
foundational language, making a crucial jump from "pay" to "treat-
ment."141 Later directives continued the reference to equal treat-
ment.
142
But these extensions cannot continue indefinitely. Even those
working within the Commission on equal treatment initiatives
acknowledge that any directive on the subject would rest on a very
WOMEN 88-102 (Supp. No. 25, Women of Europe 1987) (describing first medium-term
action program for the period 1982-1985 and second program for the period 1986-
1990). A third medium-term action program covers the period 1991-1995. See 1991
o.J. (C 142) 1 [hereinafter Third Action Program].
" See EEC TREATY art. 235.
11
7 See id. art. 119. This provision was aimed at preventing distortion of competi-
tion-the possibility that an employer could reduce costs by hiring women at low
wages-and was not intended primarily to promote equal treatment of men and
women. See COMMISSION OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, supra note 135, at 1-2.
'38 See Council Directive 75/117, 1975 OJ. (L 45) 19 (directing member nations
to introduce means of legal redress for violations of the "principle of equal pay" of
Article 119).
139 See Council Directive 75/117, arts. 1, 3 & 4, 1975 O.J. (L 45) 19-20.
1 See Equal Treatment Directive, supra note 52.
141 Id. at 40.
142 See Council Directive 86/613, 1986 Q.J. (L 359) 56 (implementing equal
treatment for the self-employed); Council Directive 86/378, 1986 O.J. (L 225) 40
(implementing equal treatment of the sexes in occupational social security schemes);
Council Directive 79/7, 1979 O.J. (L 6) 24 (implementing equal treatment of men and
women in the field of social security).
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controversial jurisdictional basis. 4 ' The existing equal treatment
directives rely on equating equal pay with equal treatment. A sexual
harassment directive grounded in the equal pay provision would rely
on additional analogies: sexual harassment as sex discrimination as
unequal treatment as unequal pay. The chain becomes more
attenuated with each new link. Although the principle of specific
attribution of powers does not specifically prohibit lawmaking based
on this kind of reasoning, it implies an ultimate limit on how far
lawmakers may go.
b. Subsidiarity
A complement to the principle of specific attribution of powers
is "subsidiarity," which refers to the federalist principle favoring
greater power for member state governments in all areas in which
they are competent, with the Community exercising power only
where strictly necessary. The principle is of foundational signifi-
cance. 144  Subsidiarity has been invoked to oppose directives
aimed at improving social welfare, the position being that member
states are capable of creating their own legislation, and that no
Community interest requires harmonization of these laws.' 45
14 Telephone Interview with Michael Rubenstein, supra note 50; Interview with
Nathalie Wiaume, supra note 73.
14 The Treaty on European Union, often referred to as the Maastricht Treaty,
imposes the principle of subsidiarity on all types of Community action:
In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle ofsubsidiarity, only if and
in so far as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently
achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the scale or
effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community.
Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, art. 3b (Maastricht Treaty), 31 I.L.M. 247,
258.
145 In the "spirit" of subsidiarity, the Commission withdrew three directives it had
previously proposed, announced that it was "further considering withdrawing"
numerous others, and weakened its planned directives in other areas. Conclusions
of the Presidency, Overall Approach to the Application by the Council of the Subsid-
iarity Principle and Article 3b of the Treaty on European Union, Dec. 12, 1992, at 26-
28 (on file with author). Directives withdrawn due to considerations of subsidiarity
concerned compulsory food labels, radio frequencies for telecommunication with
aircraft, and radio frequencies for land transportation. See id. at 26. Subjects of
directives on the list to be withdrawn included conditions of animals in zoos,
temporary importation of motor vehicles, and a network of information centers on
agricultural markets. See id. Proposals were officially weakened in the area of public
takeover bids, the definition of "shipowner," labeling of shoes, liability of suppliers
for services, and protection of persons in relation to data processing. See id. at 27.
After "consultations with interested parties," the Commission withdrew its plans for
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Applied to sexual harassment, this principle would require propo-
nents to show that existing laws are deficient because they afford
citizens varying levels of protection. Furthermore, the divergence
must be significant. For instance, an Englishwoman might hesitate
to take ajob in southern Europe because of what she has heard of
office behavior there,' but this possibility offers feeble support
indeed for Community-level intervention.
147
Even critics of subsidiarity-who see the term as a politically
laden excuse for reactionary obstruction-agree that harmonization
can burden member states.148  Harmonization decrees from
Brussels that require lawmaking, fact-gathering, adjudication,
monitoring of systems, and the dissemination of information can be
expensive and awkward to obey, especially where the necessary
infrastructure is unsteady. The frequent requirement of ongoing
contact with the Commission raises a tangle of practical questions:
Which bureau in the member state must report? What if another
directive establishes overlapping requirements-must the same data
be gathered and reported twice? The notion of restraint inherent
in subsidiarity is a reasonable one, in light of the complications that
always accompany harmonization. 4 1 In the area of sexual harass-
ment, even advocates of Community action recognize the merits of
challenges to Community-level intervention based on the principle
of subsidiarity.
2. The Objection Refuted
Jurisdictional obstacles have forced proponents of Community
law to consider the ways in which sexual harassment conflicts with
foundational principles. Unlike their American counterparts,
proponents of Community-level action against sexual harassment
have been compelled to fit their initiative within circumscribed
powers. This effort connects sexual harassment with a wider range
initiatives in several other areas, including regulation of gambling. Id. at 28.
14 Michael Rubenstein suggested this example, adding his opinion that it was a
weak justification for lawmaking. Telephone Interview with Michael Rubenstein,
supra note 50.
" The principle at stake in this kind of hesitation is the freedom of workers to
move within the Community. See EEC TREATY art. 48.
4 Interview with Virginia Graham, Director of Communications, Bureau
Europen des Unions du Consommateurs (European Consumers Union), in Brussels,
Belgium (Oct. 30, 1992).
149 See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 676-703 (discussing issues and problems
accompanying Community attempt to harmonize products liability law).
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of subjects-a connection that helps to reveal the nature of sexual
harassment as a social, economic, and moral problem. As a device
for change, this approach has achieved tangible results.
The most straightforward justification of a Community law is
social progress-equality in the workplace-and that justification has
been endorsed by several institutions of the Community. 50 But
this basis for reform ultimately brushes against the obstacles
described above: the principle of specific attribution of powers,
possible redundancy given the Equal Treatment Directive, and
subsidiarity. Advocates of reform, in their creative responses to this
conflict, have fashioned at least four conceptual advances.
a. Workplace Health and Safety
In contrast to the American approach, Europeans describe
sexual harassment as a danger to health and safety in the workplace.
Ample jurisdictional support exists for the Community to act
expansively in this area; 15 1 working conditions have always been
regarded as part of the economic policy that justified the formation
of the Community.'52 Divergences in workplace health and safety
controvert the principle of unification."'
Encouraged by the 1986 amendments to the EEC Treaty that
mention health and safety,' the Community was able to retreat
from its weaker "action program " 155 justification for workplace
equality laws and emphasize the benefits to health and safety that
would result from the abolition of discrimination. The usefulness
of this rationale is evident from the adoption of a directive to
'" See e.g., Third Action Program, supra note 135, at 2-3 (containing Council
Resolution inviting member states to implement the third medium-term action
program on equal opportunities for women and men); 1990 Resolution, supra note
56, at 3-4 (containing statement by Council on the protection of the dignity ofwomen
and men at work); 1986 O.J. (C 176) 73, 79 (containing Parliament resolution of'June
11, 1986, noting that "sexual harassment can be seen as non-respect of the principle
of equal treatment with regard to access to employment"); Equal Treatment Directive,
supra note 52, arts. 3-5 (affirming the principle of equal treatment in the workplace).
351 Foundational support appears in the EEC Treaty, which empowers the Council
to adopt directives establishing requirements for improving the health and safety of
workers. See EEC TREATY art. 118a.
15
2 See FRITZ FABRICIUS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND EUROPEAN POLITICS: THE LEGAL-
POLITICAL STATUS OF WORKERS IN THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITY 3-5 (1992).15
3 See PJ.G. KAPTEYN & P. VERLOREN VAN THEMAAT, INTRODUCTION TO THE LAw
OF THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES 627-28 (Laurence W. Gormley ed., 2d ed. 1989).
1" See supra note 151.
155 See supra note 135.
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protect pregnant women and new mothers'56 -in a year when "it
[was] almost impossible to get a social welfare directive passed."
157
This directive protects the jobs of women who must avoid hazards
to their reproductive health, forbids employers to require that
pregnant women or women who have recently given birth or are
breastfeeding perform night work, guarantees fourteen weeks of
maternity leave, and prohibits discrimination against these female
workers. 58 Structured to emphasize the health and safety argu-
ments and downplay any reference to discrimination, 159 this
directive is a telling demonstration of which jurisdictional reasoning
is flourishing in the Community.
1 60
Advocates of sexual harassment legislation appear aware of the
importance of this theme. According to several European experts,
sexual harassment is a workplace menace. The Dutch Ministry of
Social Affairs has compared it to the risk of stumbling over
equipment, or of excessive noise-dangers that responsible employ-
ers try to minimize.16 1 In his influential scholarship, Rubenstein
has used the health and safety argument to make a different
analogy: employers are expected to ensure the health and safety of
their workers prospectively, and not merely to rely on remedies for
the harm (such as disease or trauma) that may occur. Similarly,
women are entitled to a workplace that is not "polluted by sexual
harassment," in addition to legal recourse after the harm is done.
62
" See Council Directive 92/85, 1992 O.J. (L 348) 1 (introducing measures to
encourage improvements in the safety and health at work of pregnant women and
new mothers) [hereinafter Directive 92/85].
Telephone Interview with Michael Rubenstein, supra note 50.
' See Directive 92/85, supra note 156, arts. 5, 7, 8 & 10.
... The Preamble to the directive begins with a health and safetyjustification and
only later moves to other elements of its rationale. The directive's first provisions
pertain directly to workplace health. Only near the end does one find reference to
maternity leave and employment rights. See id. at 1-5.
'" An indirect demonstration of the point is made by the languishing of a draft
directive easing the burden of proof for litigants who complain of unequal pay or
treatment. See Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Burden of Proof
in the Area of Equal Pay and Equal Treatment for Women and Men, 1988 OJ. (C
176) 5. With no reference to workplace health or safety, this directive has stagnated,
despite its jurisdictional basis in several action programs and other Community
initiatives.
161 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 29, 142.1 2 Id. at 37. In Rubenstein's words:
Member States would not normally expect employees to work with
hazardous substances or dangerous machinery with no recourse until they
have contracted a disease or suffered an injury. They should not ask women
to continue to work in an environment polluted by sexual harassment with
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Both American and European data indicate that sexual harass-
ment can harm the health of its victims. European research links
sexual harassment to a variety of physical and emotional ail-
ments.1 63  According to an American report, one-third of the
women who had been sexually harassed while working for the U.S.
government reported that the harassment had aggravated a physical
or emotional condition." American case law on sexual harass-
ment indicates that many, perhaps most, successful plaintiffs make
convincing allegations of severe emotional or physical injury.1
65
In Europe, the Dortmunder Institute found that sexual harassment
was a significant source of harm to workplace health and safety. 66
The European Commission has reached the same conclusion.
1 67
Although both European and American sources are available to
support the point, however, the idea has more influence in Europe.
Why has the subject of workplace health and safety been more
influential in European than American analyses of sexual harass-
ment? A quick response is that because private law is so unimpor-
tant in Europe when compared with the United States, even a small
amount of influence looks large; indeed, the practical effects of the
workplace health and safety insight in Europe have not been
extensive. But this response does not explain the American
repudiation of an idea that has been in print since the 1979
publication of MacKinnon's book, or even earlier.16  The idea
that sexual harassment can be classified as a danger to workplace
no means of redress other than the possibility of compensation for the dam-
age they suffer.
Id.; see also Stan Gray, Sharing the Shop Floor, in BEYOND PATRIARCHY: ESSAYS BY MEN
ON PLEASURE, POWER, AND CHANGE 216, 227 (Michael Kaufman ed., 1987)
(analogizing right to safe workplace to right to choose abortion).
16' See RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 13-14, 37-38 (summarizing
findings in Belgium and the Netherlands). For more vivid descriptions of painful
experiences, see MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 25-55.
164 See generally U.S. MERrr SYS. PROTECTION BD., SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN THE
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT (1981) (supplying 1980 data).
165 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57,60 (1986) (alleging rape and
physical symptoms); Ford v. Revlon, Inc., 734 P.2d 580, 583 (Ariz. 1987) (alleging
suicide attempt and other physical effects); see also Pollack, supra note 2, at 69-70, 84
(criticizing American courts for denying redress to all but the most severely-harmed
plaintiffs).
16Telephone Interview with Michael Rubenstein, supra note 50.
167 See Agnis Hubert, Foreword to RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 4
(noting that stress induced by sexual harassment causes employees to take sick leave).168
See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 159 & n.48.
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health and safety seems hardly to have occurred to American
reformers.
The answer lies in the tension between viewing sexual harass-
ment as a discrete wrong amenable to civil litigation and viewing it
as an instance of collective harm, with neither victims nor wrongdo-
ers sharply identified, with the concept itself being merged with
other concepts. A wrongful-conduct approach dominates the entire
perception of sexual harassment. When sexual harassment is seen
as a legal wrong, tort concepts predominate and the concept of
workplace hazard becomes harder to keep in mind.
The dominance of tort principles is evident at both tactical and
theoretical levels. As a matter of tactics, those in the United States
who seek greater protection against sexual harassment in the
workplace must emphasize the wrongful aspects of this conduct, and
understate the extent to which it is a workplace hazard, because of
the potential conflict with workers' compensation. Usually workers'
compensation is an exclusive remedy for injured workers, preclud-
ing an employee with a claim recognized under this system of
insurance from making the same claim in a lawsuit. Creative
lawyering can work, and has worked, around this difficulty.169 But
the deeper problem is one of ingrained dichotomous thinking, so
that an occurrence cannot be both a tort and a routine condition of
work.17 The dichotomy tells advocates of reform that if they
pursue the workplace-health approach they will lose more of their
strength in tort than they will gain elsewhere, while at an intellectual
level the wrongful-conduct approach displaces ideas about work-
place conditions.
Wrongful-conduct hegemony also makes it difficult for American
reformers to agree that sexual harassment is a problem of workplace
conditions. Tort concepts suggest distinctions to Americans that
169 Compare the hard-to-distinguish case of Peckham v. Peckham Materials Corp.,
536 N.Y.S.2d 873,874 (App. Div. 1989) (allowing tort lawsuit against employer based
on helicopter crash on return from golf outing, where plaintiff sought to escape
workers' compensation) with Ezzy v. Workers' Compensation Appeals Bd., 194 Cal.
Rptr. 90, 95-96 (Ct. App. 1983) (allowing workers' compensation payment, in
accordance with plaintiff's wish, to summer associate injured in law firm softball
game).
170 MacKinnon argues that the paradox of workplace sexual harassment is its
banality and its resemblance to conduct not widely recognized as wrongful. See
MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 219. Her fatherJudge George MacKinnon, shared the
conventional view: sexual overtures at work, he wrote in an early hostile-environment
opinion, derive from "social patterns that to some extent are normal and expectable."
Barnes v. Costle, 561 F.2d 983, 1001 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (MacKinnon, J., concurring).
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have less resonance in Europe: the very success of tort remedies for
sexual harassment has entrenched an approach that interferes with
concepts of workplace health. Consider a hypothetical claimant who
says that hostile-environment harassment has caused her various
symptoms of middling severity-insomnia, shortness of breath, mild
depression, and headaches. She suggests that her workplace is
unsafe and unhealthy. Tort-trained American lawyers would likely
be skeptical. As they know from their legal education, effects such
as these are at least arguably mental or emotional rather than
"physical," and American tort law only reluctantly acknowledges the
claim of a plaintiff whose injuries have no physical manifestation:
that is, either tangible physical injury or an impact.17 ' A woman's
silence or passivity in response to sexual conduct evokes the tort
concept of consent and its attendant burdens on plaintiffs.1 72
Thoughts of tort create questions of causation-can this claimant
prove that her symptoms were a direct and proximate result of
sexual harassment?-that an American observer would want resolved
before condemning the workplace as unhealthy. In contrast, a
European can look at sexual harassment without the distortion
attributable to American thinking about wrongful conduct.
b. Economic Arguments
In addition to identifying health and safety justifications,
reformers have begun to connect the remedying of sexual harass-
ment with the central purpose of the Community: the improvement
of the economic union of the member states. Such a linkage creates
powerful jurisdictional support for lawmaking.
Although some costs are better documented than others,
173
sexual harassment is widely acknowledged to be costly and burden-
some. American reports estimate conservatively that sexual
harassment cost the U.S. government $267 million over the two-year
period from May 1985 to May 1987, and $180 million for the two-
year period from May 1978 to May 1980.174 These estimates are
1 See W. PAGE KEETON ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 54,
at 361-65 (5th ed. 1984).
l7 See Mary Jo Shaney, Note, Perceptions of Harm: The Consent Defense in Sexual
Harassment Cases, 71 IOwA L. REv. 1109, 1128 (1986).
1's Measures aimed at reducing or repairing sexual harassment have not been
proven to result in financial saving, because of incomplete data. In theory, one could
construct an anti-harassment apparatus so expensive that condoning harassment
would be cheaper. Better data on the costs of sexual harassment are needed to save
this debate from immersion into ideology and preexisting beliefs.
'74 See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., supra note 164; UPDATE, supra note 48,
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of costs to the government qua employer; 7 5 no attempt has been
made to assess other quantities such as lost tax revenues or medical
costs covered by the government in transfer payments. Although
hard numbers are not available, writers argue plausibly that sexual
harassment has a direct impact on the profitability of enter-
prises. 76 Sexual harassment causes absenteeism in two senses of
the term: the harassed worker is likely both to take time off from
work and to function poorly while physically present at her job.77
An employer who condones sexual harassment-whose main
criterion for employees becomes their willingness to tolerate harass-
ment-will likely end up with workers who have weaker traditional
qualifications and who are, therefore, less productive.
7 8
Although employers and governments pay some of the price for
sexual harassment, women pay more. An early American study
showed that two-thirds of harassed female workers lost their jobs as
a result of the harassment.179 Not only is this turnover expensive
to employers, and probably to government as well, but its costs are
also devastating to the workers themselves. Workers who choose to
stay in jobs where they are harassed absorb most of the costs. Often
they must live with humiliation, depression, and an anger that taints
at 40. A majority of respondents studied in 1980 said that the sexual harassment they
encountered in the federal government was comparable to what they had encoun-
tered while working for other employers, suggesting that the cost estimates are of
general validity. See U.S. MERIT SYS. PROTECTION BD., supra note 164.
I's The figures represent the costs of replacing employees who left work because
of sexual harassment, medical insurance benefits and sick leave, and reduced
productivity. See UPDATE, supra note 48, at 4041.
176 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 3; see also Ronnie Sandroff, Sexual Harassment
in the Fortune 500, WORKING WOMAN, Dec. 1988, at 69, 69 (citing estimate that sexual
harassment costs the average Fortune 500 company $6.7 million annually in
absenteeism, turnover, and lower productivity).
1" See Lipper, supra note 85, at 299-300 (citations omitted).
178 See Suzanne E. Andrews, The Legal and Economic Implications of Sexual
Harassment, 14 N.C. CENT. L.J. 113, 169 (1983). It is difficult to estimate the extent
to which condoning sexual harassment as a perquisite for harassers enables employers
to retain talented, productive harassers as employees. A worker with a taste for
harassment might accept lower wages if he is freer to harass. But because sexual
harassment distracts workers and takes up their time-whether they are victims or
perpetrators-it is reasonable to assume that choosing to condone harassment as a
perquisite for harassers is not a profitable strategy for an employer.
179 Forty-two percent felt compelled to quit their jobs when the harassment
became intolerable, and 24% were fired for failing to accede to demands or for
complaining about the harassment. See Christine 0. Merriman & Cora G. Yang,
Note, Employer Liabilityfor Coworker Sexual Harassment Under Title VII, 13 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 83, 84 n.6 (1984) (citing Working Women's Inst., Sexual
Harassment on theJob: Questions and Answers (1980) (unpublished manuscript)).
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their relationships with men;.8 they "risk losing promotions,
seniority, and better job assignments."1 8 ' Sexual harassment thus
amounts to a tax on women who venture into the workplace.
8 2
Sexual harassment also distorts competition in several senses of
the term:' the competition for workplace success between men
and women, the competitive strength of employers who pay some
of the costs of harassment, and, perhaps, the economic competition
within a government entity such as the Community. Proponents of
change in the EC have not asserted these arguments forcefully, in
part because they appear difficult to make when compared to a
simpler appeal to fairness, and in part because the distortions are
indirect."8 4 The combination of American-culled data and Europe-
an jurisdictional pressure may, in the future, give these arguments
intense power.
c. The Dignity of a Worker
A third conceptual expansion refers to "dignity," a term often
found in European scholarly writing but encountered less frequently
in the United States. 85 Although no precise definition is avail-
able, "dignity" apparently refers to human rights, minimally stated.
To say that a worker deserves to be treated with dignity is not to
promise her rewards, equality of opportunity, unlimited potential of
advancement on her merits, or even fairness. Most workers would
want more than mere dignity at work, and justice demands more
180 See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 47-48.
181 Lipper, supra note 85, at 299.
" For example, Wendy Pollack has written that as ajourneyman carpenter she
used to seekjobs where the level of sexual harassment would be tolerable, rather than
jobs that would challenge or increase her technical skills. See Pollack, supra note 2,
at 37. She adds that many women who have qualified for high-paying, blue-collar
employment leave the trades for lower-paying work because of sexual harassment.
See id. at 37-38.
1"3 At a speech in London at which I was present, delivered on June 25, 1993,
Agn~s Hubert, head of the Equal Opportunities Unit of the European Commission,
made strong, on-the-record statements about the relationship between sexual
harassment and economic competitiveness. Hubert, an economist by training,
declared that "European competitiveness depends on the optimal use of human
resources," and to this end the workplace needs to be "friendlier to women," to
"become a mixed-sex environment." She also said that mixed-sex work settings were
more productive than single-sex settings.
"4 Telephone Interview with Michael Rubenstein, supra note 50.
" See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 1 (noting that in Europe sexual harassment
is discussed with reference to the "dignity and the rights of women").
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than this minimum. Dignity is a conceptual advance, then, in that
it delineates a smaller ideal.
18 6
Appeals to "dignity" may resonate with persons who cannot
listen to "feminism," "women's rights," "sexism," "sexual harass-
ment," and the like. The old-fashioned word offers reassurance and
is more familiar to many people than the concept of sexual
harassment.18 7 Apologists for sexual harassers often claim to have
tradition on their side; 188 an opposite tradition can be traced back
to the most venerable sources.
18 9
With its echo of a well-known phrase, "the dignity of labor,"
dignity connects harassed workers with a history of documented
unjust treatment. Thus, efforts to prevent or remedy sexual
harassment are associated with the rights of workers in general.'
Western Europe has traditionally insisted that its workers have
certain freedoms, rights, and entitlements because they are workers.
One of the "four fundamental freedoms" of the Community is the
freedom of movement for workers.'91 Workers are encouraged to
"seek employment and change their place of employment according
to their own ideas and interests throughout the entire territory of
the Community."9 2 The European Court of Justice held that this
guarantee has direct effect: individuals are entitled to have this
right enforced in the courts of the member states.' 9 Linked via
186 As such, it is analogous to the small donation that a fundraiser is pleased to
accept, with the belief that if a contributor has acknowledged the goal and thinks of
herself as a supporter of the endeavor, more support will follow.
187 For example, "fewer women will say that they have experienced 'sexual
harassment' than will say they have experienced 'unwanted sexual advances.'"
RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIEs, supra note 23, at 9.
188 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 430 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(declaring that Title VII was not designed "to bring about a magical transformation
in the social mores of American workers"), af/'d, 805 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 233, 236 (N.D. Cal.
1976) ("The attraction of males to females and females to males is a natural sex
phenomenon and it is probable that this attraction plays at least a subtle part in most
personnel decisions."), rev'd, 600 F.2d 211 (9th Cir. 1979).
'89 See Genesis 1:27 (stating that men and women are created in the image of God);
see also BORCHARDT, supra note 130, at 11 (connecting European Community human
rights law with eighteenth-century universalist declarations).
" See supra note 134 and accompanying text (discussing the equal treatment of
women mentioned in the Community Charter of Fundamental Social Rights of
Workers).
19 See EEC TREATY art. 48.
192 BORCHARDT, supra note 130, at 11.
193 See Case 41/74, Van Duyn v. Home Office, 1974 E.C.R. 1337, 1347. According
to one writer, the importance of the direct effect of any Community law "can scarcely
be overemphasized." BORCHARDT, supra note 130, at 42. Direct effect turns "the
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the concept of dignity to one of the most important freedoms of the
Community, the idea of a right to workplace respect connects
progressive visions of progress with a longstanding tradition.
d. Decentralization as a Conceptual Advance
Just as reformers reached into other domains of law and
tradition to create linkages, they also were willing to jettison an idea
that hindered rather than advanced their strategy. In response to
the cry of subsidiarity, reformers withdrew from the plan of a
directive and the harmonization of national laws that goes with
directives. They substituted a recommendation with an attached
code of practice, in the hope that the softer tone of suggestion
rather than command would do more good in the workplace.194
In discarding, or at least putting aside, their plans for a
directive, reform partisans took a gamble. They quieted the
criticism about subsidiarity that had threatened to destroy any
attempt at EC-level reform. But their decision foreseeably resulted
in some decentralization of the effort to combat sexual harassment.
Directives must each be implemented at the national level, and the
Commission has the right and duty to watch the nations vigilantly
to determine whether implementation has proceeded in the proper
manner. Implementation that proceeds too slowly or that does not
track the Brussels-written original language can be-and not
infrequently has been-challenged formally in the European Court
of Justice.195 In contrast, a recommendation provides no basis for
this centralized power. To make their reform work, partisans had
to trust people they did not know and could not control.
freedoms of the common market into rights that may be enforced in a court of law."
Id.
194 See supra note 59 and accompanying text; see also Rubenstein, supra note 49, at
74 (predicting that should the milder recommendation prove ineffective, pressure for
a directive would increase).
195 See EEC TREATY art. 169. The Commission paid rigorous attention to a well-
known directive, on products liability. It took Italy and Britain to the Court of'Justice
for passing implementing legislation that did not track closely enough the language
of the directive, and also brought proceedings against six other countries for failing
to meet the deadline for implementation. See Bernstein, supra note 10, at 675 n.17,
708 (citations omitted).
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B. Skepticism About Fault
American sexual harassment law rests on firm beliefs about
morality and fault. Although a source of moral instruction and
inspiration, these beliefs have been received with European
skepticism as well. Some of the skepticism can be explained as
simple lack of progress; some of it, however, helps to shed light on
the weaknesses of American remedies for sexual harassment.
1. Barriers to Litigation
The American tradition of vindicating individual rights through
private-law actions in the courts conflicts with a different tradition
in Europe. This tradition is expressed in the lower number of full-
fledged civil lawsuits in Europe, per capita, than in the United
States. 19 6 Aggrieved Europeans are kept out of the civil courts
with hurdles that have struck various observers as antidemocratic
and repressive, 197 as the admirable restraints of a potential litiga-
tion explosion, 198 as good insurance against an insurance cri-
sis,' 99 and as a sound tradition that ought nevertheless to be
somewhat liberalized.00 The barriers work. Injured persons are
discouraged from suits by the virtual absence of contingency fees,
the frequent requirement that losers reimburse winners for their
costs and fees, relatively low awards to successful plaintiffs, the
"1 Tremendous controversy surrounds this point-especially because "lawsuit" is
hard to define across cultures-but most researchers and scholars agree that Europe
is less litigious than the United States. For a dissenting view, see Marc Galanter, The
Day After the Litigation Explosion, 46 MD. L. REV. 3, 7 (1986) (noting that per capita
use of the courts is roughly the same in the United States as in England and
Denmark); for elaboration of the point that efforts to measure litigiousness or to
count lawsuits are exceedingly difficult, see Michael J. Saks, Do We Really Know
Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System-And Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L.
REV. 1147, 1154-55 (1992). To generalize about "Europe" is, of course, imprecise,
since litigation behavior varies greatly from nation to nation.
19
7 
See JOANNE DOROSHOW, THE CASE FOR THE CIVIL JURY: SAFEGUARDING A
PILLAR OF DEMOCRACY 3, 13 (1992).
198 Cf. WALTER K. OLSON, THE LITIGATION EXPLOSION: WHAT HAPPENED WHEN
AMERICA UNLEASHED THE LAwsurr 2 (1991) (declaring that excessive litigation is the
only feature of American society that "hardly anyone admires").
19 See Patrick Thieffry et al., Strict Product Liability in the EEC: Implementation,
Practice and Impact on U.S. Manufacturers of Directive 85/374, 25 TORT & INS. L.J. 65,
88-89 (1989) (discussing how features of European legal system limit excessive liability
claims).
o See BEUC: Community Consumer Policy in a State of Paralysis, EUR. ENV'T, May
4, 1993, at 5 [hereinafter BEUC] (stating that consumers need greater access to legal
services for protection).
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absence of punitive damages, lack of access to a jury, endemic
delays, and conservative discovery rules.2 11 An effort at the Com-
munity level and in the nations to increase "access to justice"
20 2
has set modest goals and moves toward them slowly. Whether
manipulated by cynical elites to stay in their place or simply
peaceable, Europeans show less desire than Americans to flood the
courts.
20 3
Because European victims of sexual harassment lack the
financial leverage over their adversaries that they would have in the
United States, they are at one undeniable disadvantage. "It pays to
discriminate" in Europe, an English lawyer observes, where an
employer can expect to escape monetary punishment.2 4  The
disadvantage is not confined to simple exclusion from the courts.
Once harassment occurs, any claimant who wants more of a remedy
from the employer than he is immediately willing to give is forced
either to retreat or, in economists' terms, to bargain in the shadow
of a law that is not in her favor.20 5  Most sexual harassment
claimants make only modest demands for redress, but from the
201 These generalizations apply to most, but not all, nations of the European
Community; exceptions exist. For instance, in Luxembourg, each side pays its own
legal and court fees (except witness fees). See Gavin Souter, More Uniform Legal Rules,
Procedures Urged for E.C., BUS. INS., Jan. 27, 1992, at 79, 81 (quoting a privately-
prepared survey report). Greece permits contingency fee agreements; Britain is
beginning to do so as well; and in other countries, the ban on these agreements can
be evaded. See Roxanne B. Conlin & Clarence King, Jr., Revisiting the 'Loser Pays'
Issue, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 3, 1992, at 27, 28 (discussing recent changes in British law);
Souter, supra, at 81. Similarly, discovery is relatively liberal in Britain and Ireland.
See Conlin & King, supra, at 28.
202 In a Council document known as the Sutherland Report, one of 38 proposals
concerned increased access to legal services for consumers. Telephone Interview with
Marco Gasparinetti, Consumer Policy Unit, Commission of the European Communi-
ties (Jan. 13, 1993); see also BEUC, supra note 200, at 5 (noting that access to legal
services is the focus of the Sutherland Report's proposals to help provide better
consumer protection).
2. Judge Earl Johnson of the California Court of Appeal has argued that
Americans enjoy less access to the courts than Europeans because court-appointed
lawyers are more widely available for civil suits in Europe. See EarlJohnson,Jr., The
Right to Counsel in Civil Cases: An International Perspective, 19 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 341,
341-45 (1985). The connection between court-appointed lawyers and access is
certainly debatable; despite their formal' right to counsel in many countries,
Europeans are still discouraged (and thus, in effect, barred) from suing because of
many factors, particularly financial risk and their inability to recover sizeable awards.
021 Telephone Interview with Denise Kingsmill, supra note 101. But see supra text
accompanying notes 173-78 (discussing the costs of sexual harassment to employers).
The problem is largely one of agency and organizational behavior, where individuals
employed in a firm cannot perceive all of the costs of harassment.
205 I am grateful to Tom Heller for this Coasean point.
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employer's point of view the cure can be costly, much more
expensive than the expected cost of litigation in Europe. By
contrast, an American employer knows that the legal expenses for
a routine, uneventful Title VII lawsuit might amount to many
thousands of dollars.2 6 The court of law, with its power to take
money, is an important weapon for victims of sexual harassment, no
matter what kind of relief they seek.
As American feminists have pointed out, however, American
victims of sexual harassment pay a price for this weapon. 20 7 This
price can also be seen in terms of barriers to litigation. While
European recipients of sexual harassment are kept out of the courts
by obvious expressions of skepticism about the value of open
access-they usually cannot afford a lawyer, nor conduct complete
party-initiated discovery, nor recover much money-Americans have
their own obstacles. Like her European counterpart, an American
victim may take comfort in knowing that workplace sexual harass-
ment is illegal. Yet she faces parallel problems of locating and
convincing a lawyer, refuting archaic prejudices, and, if she prevails,
extracting meaningful damages from a legal system that does not
often regard her injury as important. This is not to say that
American and European litigants suffer from equal barriers to
litigation: American courts are more accessible. The ways in which
they are closed, however, deserve attention.
The victim of sexual harassment is a vulnerable player within the
courts. Sexual harassment protections in America are almost
completely the product of the judiciary; as a statute, Title VII gives
virtually no guidance about this type of sex discrimination. Tort
remedies necessarily develop in the courts and demand judicial
cooperation. When the concept of sexual harassment was new, the
EEOC played a leadership role, but during the 1980s and early
1990s, the agency turned away from such progress.208 Reliance on
21 See Vincent J. Apruzzese, Selected Recent Developments in EEO Law: The Civil
Rights Act of 1991, Sexual Harassmen and the Emerging Role of ADR, 43 LAB. L.J. 325,
333 (1992).207 See Mary I. Coombs, Telling the Victim's Stoy, 2 TEx.J. WOMEN & L. 277, 278
(1993) (describing the hostility and disbelief that complainants face); Adrienne D.
Davis & Stephanie M. Wildman, The Legacy of Doubt: Treatment of Sex and Race in the
Hill-Thomas Hearings, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1367, 1376-77 (1992) (comparingAnita Hill's
treatment by the Senate Judiciary Committee to a "lynching"); see also infra text
accompanying notes 233-38.
':i Even before the Reagan and Bush administrations, EEOC officials openly
expressed their indifference to civil rights for women. See GERALD N. ROSENBERG,
THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 252-53 (1991)
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the courts means dependence on unrepresentative and often
conservative institutions.
Liberal discovery rules, strategically valuable to plaintiffs because
of the burdens they impose on defendants, increase the settlement
value of cases but also increase the hardship of litigation for
plaintiffs. Because the plaintiff generally claims emotional harm,
and because her case is always about sex, a defendant can make a
strong argument for the relevance of inquiry into the plaintiff's
sexual and emotional life. 209 A plaintiff, however, seldom has a
justification in the discovery rules to pry into the life of any
defendant.2 10  Ordinary Americans who know almost nothing
about the law usually know this much: anything they have to hide
(such as an abortion, a difficult divorce, treatment for mental
illness, a rocky employment history) would not remain hidden for
long if they were to become plaintiffs in a personal injury lawsuit.
(relating the absence of significant EEOC action on sex discrimination in the 1960s);
see also Eric Schnapper, Statutoy Misinterpretations: A Legal Autopsy, 68 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 1095, 1133 (1993) (noting the EEOC's opposition to several aspects of the
Civil Rights Act of 1991); Michele A. Estrin, Note, Retroactive Application of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 to Pending Cases, 90 MICH. L. REv. 2035, 2055 & n.140 (1992)
(discussing pro-employer stance by the EEOC on retroactivity question). In the
Meritor case, the EEOC filed a brief arguing for limited employer liability. See Brief
for the United States and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission as Amici
Curiae at 18, Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986) (No. 84-1979). The
arrival of a Democratic administration in 1993 marked a political shift in the agency.
" Discovery disputes sometimes present plaintiffs with no-win possibilities. Even
if the judge or magistrate refuses to allow the defendant to pursue a scurrilous line
of inquiry, the very presentation of the inquiry can force the plaintiffto endure slurs
and name-calling (that are not actionable under defamation law). See e.g., Priest v.
Rotary, 98 F.R.D. 755, 758-59 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (rejecting an attempt by defendant to
prove that plaintiff frequently lived with men for economic gain); Knoettsen v.
Superior Ct., 273 Cal. Rptr. 731, 741 (Ct. App. 1990) (rejecting an attempt by
defendant to discover information about sexual attack on plaintiff during her
childhood); Mendez v. Superior Ct., 273 Cal. Rptr. 636, 638-39 (Ct. App. 1988)
(rejecting an attempt by defendant to introduce evidence at trial that plaintiff had had
extramarital affairs).
210 In one case where three women sued a man for sexual harassment, the attorney
for the defendant issued deposition subpoenas to several men: the plaintiffs' current
lovers, the father of one plaintiff's child, a photographer alleged to have taken
"sexually suggestive pictures of one or more of the plaintiffs," and a psychologist who
had been treating one of the plaintiffs. Mitchell v. Hutchings, 116 F.R.D. 481, 483
(D. Utah 1987). Although the court quashed several of the subpoenas and limited the
scope of discovery, any reader of Federal Rules Decisions can enjoy salacious gossip
about Lynn Mitchell, Tiffany Musser, and Wendy Weston, whereas it is quite
impossible to tell from the opinion anything about Hutchings, even what he was
alleged to have done. See id. at 485-86; see also Bailey v. Unocal Corp., 700 F. Supp.
396, 397 (N.D. Ill. 1988) (omitting name of alleged harasser, even though he was a
named defendant).
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Countless claims are suppressed because of well-founded beliefs
about civil discovery.
A victim of harassment who is willing to sue despite this threat
to her privacy will often appear to lawyers (even her own lawyers)
and judges to be a less-than-ideal plaintiff. The very existence of
her claim might suggest to some that she did not do enough to avert
the harm, that she did not report it in time, or that she must be a
troublemaker who deserved unpleasant consequences such as
negative job evaluations. Double binds tug in several directions.
Women have been blamed for quitting the jobs where they were
harassed, and blamed for not quitting; blamed for complaining
about the harassment, and for the failure to complain.21' A
woman who was devastated by sexual references must be a thin-
skinned prude, and a woman who lived through them with compo-
sure obviously did not suffer any damage that a court could re-
dress.212  What else did she expect? She entered an all-female
harassment trap like a waitress job, or a harsh workplace that was
virtually all-male, or a hotel room for a meeting at the summons of
her white-collar boss. She ought to have known what would await
her.
These prejudices are not mere ephemera floating around a
lawsuit: American judges have written some of them into employ-
ment discrimination doctrine. 211 Justice Rehnquist in Meitor
invited defense attorneys to bring the plaintiff's dress, conversation
and workplace demeanor into court, so that it could be determined
whether she was the sort of person who would welcome sexual
advances on the job.21 4 Apparently to close the courthouse doors
211 See Deborah L. Rhode, Sexual Harassment, 65 S. CAL. L. REV. 1459, 1465 (1992)
("If a woman doesn't make a strong contemporaneous complaint, the assumption is
that harassment didn't occur; if she does make the protest, she's overreacting,
strident, humorless, and oversensitive.").
2 12 See Coombs, supra note 207, at 299 (noting how Anita Hill's poise during the
Thomas confirmation hearings counted against her).
2,. See, e.g., Ukarish v. Magnesium Elektron, 31 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1315,
1321 (D.N.J. 1983) (denying relief to a woman who appeared to "condone, if not
participate," in workplace sexual banter); Can v. Kepro Circuit Sys., 28 Fair Empl.
Prac. Cas. (BNA) 639,64041 (E.D. Mo. 1982) (denying relief to woman who had used
"sexually explicit" and "crude and vulgar" language with her colleagues); Halpert v.
Wertheim & Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21, 23 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (noting the
toughness of the plaintiff and ruling in favor of the defendant). These cases are old,
but their dicta have not been repudiated. For discussion of this issue, see Dawn D.
Bennett-Alexander, Lower Court Interpretations of the Meritor Decision: PuttingFlesh on
the Supreme Court's Sexual Harassment Skeleton, 6 WIS. WOMEN'S L.J. 35, 42-60 (1991).
214 See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68-69 (1986). Wendy Pollack has
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to a bogeywoman-the hypersensitive, priggish, and litigious
worker-judges have required that, in Title VII cases, sexual
harassment must be extreme, persistent, or outrageous, even though
no such limitation exists in the statute. 21 5 The Sixth Circuit has
provided a virtual assumption-of-risk defense, preventing recovery
under Title VII in a case where the plaintiff voluntarily took a job
in a harsh environment.2 6 As commentators have pointed out,
such a holding is unthinkable in other employment contexts such as
race discrimination or workplace health and safety.
217
Tort claims offer great power, but to judges rather than plain-
tiffs. 218 The American-created causes of action, invasion of privacy
and intentional infliction of emotional distress, raise subtle hurdles.
As mentioned previously, many judges are skeptical of the privacy
tort and believe it ought to be used sparingly.219 A cause of action
for intentional infliction of emotional distress requires outrageous
conduct, and judges have wide latitude to decide that cruel, ugly,
written the pithiest critique of this part of the Meritor holding- "If Vinson's speech
or dress was inappropriate for the work environment, she should have been told, not
raped." Pollack, supra note 2, at 56. Contrast a British decision refusing to take into
account the fact that the claimant had posed for a tabloid newspaper in "a flimsy
costume." Wileman v. Minilec Eng'g Ltd., [1988] I.R.L.R. 144, cited in RUBENSTEIN,
supra note 74, at 48.
215 See Meritor, 477 U.S. at 67 (citing to lower court cases that require the plaintiff
to show the severity and persistence of the harassment); Kotcher v. Rosa & Sullivan
Appliance Ctr., Inc., 957 F.2d 59, 62 (2d Cir. 1992) (noting that harassment must be
severe or pervasive, repeated, and continuous to constitute a claim under Title VII);
Graham v. American Airlines, Inc., 731 F. Supp. 1494, 1502 (N.D. Okla. 1989)
(finding that the plaintiff failed to show that the sexual harassment was severe,
persistent, or pervasive enough to create a hostile workplace environment). To an
extent that remains uncertain at this point, these proof requirements have been
reduced by Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367 (1993).
216 See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 620-21 (6th Cir. 1986), cert.
denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
217 See Vhay, supra note 114, at 348 (noting that no other area of discrimination
law demands "such a high level of moral blame before finding liability"); see also Lisa
Rhode, Note, The Sixth Circuit's Double Standard in Hostile Work Environment Claims:
Davis v. Monsanto Chemical Co., 858 F.2d 345 (6th Cir. 1988), 58 U. CIN. L. REV.
779, 799-801, 804-07 (1989) (arguing that it is inconsistent for the Sixth Circuit to
require plaintiffs to prove that they were actually offended in sexual harassment cases,
while presuming such offense in racial harassment cases, since in both types of cases
the conduct must be offensive to a reasonable person).
2" The existence of a legal claim does not necessarily imply progressive potential.
Obsolete causes of action such as breach of promise, seduction, criminal conversation,
and alienation of affections could in theory have been used to advance feminist goals,
see Larson, supra note 64, at 380-82, but in real experience did not. I am grateful to
Stephen Sugarman for raising this point.
219 See supra notes 104-05 and accompanying text.
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and willful behavior does not quite meet that standard. 22' And no
matter which tort a plaintiff uses to express her complaint of
workplace sexual harassment, she faces the possibility that the court
will deem her claim barred by workers' compensation.
22
1
For both employment discrimination and tort claims, courts
tend to require a showing of tremendous harm done to a flawless
plaintiff. Wendy Pollack has identified the elements of a winning
case: findings that the offensive conduct was overfly sexual; physical
contact or physical harm; several victims, or at least several
witnesses, testifying for the plaintiff; and more than one harasser or
a harasser who was a supervisor.2 22 Victorious plaintiffs usually
have extraordinarily shocking stories to tell. Lawsuits that result in
courtroom triumph or sizeable settlements are literally exceptional
cases. In sum, there is a great gap between what women call sexual
harassment in response to surveys and what American courts are
prepared to remedy.
The remedy itself is also uncertain for the small number of
plaintiffs who convince courts that they have suffered a legal wrong.
For many years, plaintiffs could not receive punitive or non-
economic damages under Title VII; the Civil Rights Act of 1991,
which made these damages available, also capped them.223 Tort
law offers the possibility of unlimited damages, but a tort claim does
not give the victim whatever benefits of expertise and support the
EEOC provides.
Courts provide an inadequate remedy in a larger sense as well.
The party-initiated, bipolar design of civil litigation captures part of
the sexual harassment picture: a victim brings a wrongdoer to
justice and exacts recompense. But an important part is missing.
Workplace sexual harassment appears to most observers to be a
collective harm. It is overwhelmingly collective to those who see it
220 One commentator offers as an example Hooten v. Pennsylvania College of
Optometry, 601 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Pa. 1984), where the plaintiff alleged that the
defendants had made disparaging remarks about her status as a wife and mother,
overloaded her work schedule so that she would make errors, and did not come to
her aid when she collapsed at work. See id. at 1153. The court would not permit the
claim to reach a jury, holding as a matter of law that the complaint did not allege
sufficient outrageousness to support a claim for intentional infliction of emotional
distress. See id. at 1155; Schoenheider, supra note 105, at 1483-84.
22 SeeJane B. Korn, The Fungible Woman and Other Myths of Sexual Harassment, 67
TUL. L. REV. 1363, 1379-80 (1993) (surveying state court decisions).
' See Pollack, supra note 2, at 69.
22 See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102(a), (b)(3), 105 Stat.
1071, 1072-73 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(a), (b)(3) (Supp. III 1991)).
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as abuse of powerless women by powerful men. Less controversial-
ly, it is collective in the sense that it takes place within an organiza-
tion. The employer plays an ongoing (if sometimes passive) role in
sexual harassment, and often the individual harasser is a repeat
offender. Plaintiffs often report that they were impressed with the
communal aspects of their problem, and that they could not have
endured their legal battle but for their conviction that they were
improving the lives of other workers. Thus, litigation acknowledges
the collective nature of harm to some degree, but it is so hard on
the individual litigant that she must regard herself as something of
an anomaly, or perhaps a hero, in order to proceed.22 4
Like a Cold War nuclear weapon, litigation has undeniable
power as a threat and a device of destruction. But if it is true that
victims of harassment do not want a weapon but rather cessation of
the harassment and possibly some disciplining of the offender,
225
litigation does not serve their aims well. The filing of a lawsuit
usually takes place after the worker has done something drastic to
stop the harassment. Although the plaintiff herself will seldom be
harassed again by the same individual, litigation does not prevent
the harassment from recurring. The offender will suffer scandal
and embarrassment-often no more than what the plaintiff will
experience-but may well escape discipline. Usually, the best
comfort to a victorious plaintiff is the hope that both specific and
general deterrence will result. To this end, litigation is uniquely
valuable. As an ordinary remedy, it warrants the skepticism with
which Europeans regard it.
226
"
4 See generally DEBORAH L. RHODE, JUSTICE AND GENDER: SEX DISCRIMINATION
AND THE LAw 236 (1989) (emphasizing, in the context of sexual harassment, the
critical-theory contention that "overreliance on rights can disempower").
22 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 51, at 27.
26 For a more detailed assessment of the harmful effects of blame and fault-
finding in sexual harassment litigation, see infra part II.B.2. American feminists
frequently discuss the value of litigation in advancing an agenda. Professor Coombs
has argued that telling nonlitigation stories about sexual harassment and rape may be
a more promising avenue of progress than the courts, in light of the Clarence
Thomas confirmation hearings and William Kennedy Smith rape trial. See Coombs,
supra note 207, at 303-14. But see Larson, supra note 64, at 445-53 (defending her
optimism about the progressive potential of a new tort of sexual deceit and
addressing procedural objections to such a tort).
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2. Repudiating the American Focus on Blame
In the American morality drama, the claimant, the harasser, and
occasionally the employer play principal roles, all as individuals.
227
Their fault, or lack thereof, is critical to their fate.228 Because of
the bipolar nature of civil liability law, the parties win when they
show they are not at fault and lose when they fail to exonerate
themselves. The dominance of employment discrimination princi-
ples over tort principles in sexual harassment litigation has blurred
the individualist, win-lose line somewhat, especially in its provision
for remedies other than money damages. But claims of sexual
harassment are ultimately resolved in the United States with
reference to fault.
European and American observers agree that a fault-based
approach works well in the so-called easy cases, those involving force
or blatant abuse of power. A subtler understanding becomes
difficult, however, because the majority of instances of sexual
harassment in the workplace do not involve aggression so obvious
as rape or quid pro quo demands. The fault paradigm is less suited
to address hostile-environment sexual harassment.
American sexual harassment doctrine points up this problem in
its major controversies. The most famous of these is the reasonable
man/reasonable woman/reasonable person dilemma. Although this
question is not directly addressed to the fault inquiry, it attempts to
fix blame: Did the person who created or tolerated the challenged
condition thereby create a hostile environment? A harasser must
have violated a standard of reasonableness in order to be culpable
2 Contrast one European approach. A trade union in Denmark advises persons
who believe they are beingharassed to "regard the person harassingyou as a problem
for the working environment-not as your personal responsibility." RUBENSTEIN & DE
VRIES, supra note 23, at 53 (citing How to Deal With Sexual Harassment?, a publication
of HK, the Danish clerical workers union).
22s American employment discrimination is, of course, not fault-based in several
senses of the term; I use "fault" more colloquially here to refer to the truth-seeking
function of a lawsuit. Because all litigation seeks to determine whether a defendant
is or is not culpable, and all employment discrimination cases must refer to incidents
involving complaining witnesses, the question of fault (which in sexual harassment
cases is never limited to the defendant) is pervasive in employment discrimination
case law. Later in this Article I place American sex discrimination law in the middle
of a fault continuum, with fault in the sense of tortious conduct at one end and a
pure focus on workplace conditions (one concern of Title VII) at the other. See infra
part III.A. For analysis of the tension between collective concerns and private-law
concepts of wrongdoing in civil rights litigation, see Sheldon Nahmod, Section 1983
Discourse: The Move From Constitution to Tort, 77 GEO. LJ. 1719, 1738-44 (1989).
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for creating a hostile environment. But a gender divide sometimes
separates perceptions of what is offensive and thus blamewor-
thy.229 To remind a man of his sexuality, as MacKinnon points
out, is to pay tribute to his power, because no tension exists among
the many domains in which a man can be powerful, admirable, and
strong.23 0 But to remind a woman of her sexuality while she is at
work is to send the message that she is merely an object, rather than
a skilled worker and a complete person.3 1  Exceptions to these
generalizations exist; the degree to which an individual woman or
man subscribes to this gender-linked approach to sexual references
cannot be fully known to another person until the recipient has had
a chance to respond to the challenged conduct. Fault thus becomes
difficult to adjudicate, as lawyers andjudges, who are predominantly
men, either apply an ill-fitting "reasonable man" standard to the
conduct or struggle to imagine a woman's reasonable response to
gestures, talk, and images of sex.
232
While the putative harasser faces a jumble of conflicting ideas
about what kind of conduct is reasonable, offensive, or blamewor-
thy, the claimant is constrained to defend her own conduct by
virtually proving her own lack of fault. Under current doctrine,
The major empirical work in the area is BARBARA GUTEK, SEX AND THE
WORKPLACE: THE IMPACT OF SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND HARASSMENT ON WOMEN, MEN,
AND ORGANIZATIONS (1985). Gutek found that a majority of men but a minority of
women found sexual advances at work to be flattering; a majority of women but a
minority of men found sexual advances at work to be insulting. See id. at 96-97.
In contrast, according to a British study, men and women were in virtual
agreement when asked, in a telephone survey, to say whether certain types of conduct
do or do not constitute sexual harassment. See Michael Rubenstein, Harassment
Policies Show Growing Sophistication, EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES REV., Nov.-Dec. 1992, at
32, 33.
230 See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 171.
231 See id.; see also Hadsell, supra note 110, at 11; Morrison Torrey, We Get the
Message-Pornography in the Workplace, 22 Sw. U. L. REV. 53,87-89 (1992). In her study
of sexual overtures at work, Gutek found that usually when a woman made advances
to a man she had singled him out based on "friendliness or attraction," whereas in
the majority of advances made by men, one habitual initiator approached many
women. GUTEK, supra note 229, at 88. Gutek also found that woman-to-man
advances almost never harmed a man's career and that women tended to approach
men of equal or higher rank at work, see id. at 158, whereas in man-to-woman
advances the woman was usually a subordinate, younger and more physically
attractive than the man, see id. at 61-63.
'-" Cf. Nancy S. Ehrenreich, Pluralist Myths and Powerless Men: The Ideology of
Reasonableness in Sexual Harassment Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1177, 1232 (1990) (asserting
that "the homogeneous image of society that results from the traditional equation of
reasonableness with societal consensus is simply too harmful, excluding all but the
dominant elite, to justify retention").
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conduct that is welcome is not actionable under Title VII, and
unwelcomeness is an element of the plaintiffs prima facie case.
233
A claimant often must refute allegations that she enjoyed the
conduct, went along with it, encouraged it, or failed to communi-
cate her displeasure when presented with ambiguous behavior.
23 4
Courts allow defendants to introduce evidence that the claimant
wore provocative clothes to work, laughed at or told risqu6jokes, or
appeared pleased to flirt.235  Other civil-rights plaintiffs-African-
Americans steered away from housing, older workers terminated
from their jobs, or high school girls deprived of athletic programs-
are presumed to have regarded the discrimination as unwelcome.
One might infer some displeasure from the very filing of a com-
plaint.
23 6
The problem, of course, is that sex discrimination-the disparate
treatment of women and men-sometimes deserves respect. Most
Americans approve of, or at least condone, the search for intimate
partners and expect the seekers to eliminate either men or women
from the pool of candidates. If a sexual union can express an
23- See Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 68 (1986). Faint rumblings from
some appellate courts suggest a partial rejection of this proof requirement, although
Meritor is quite clear on the point. See Ann C.Juliano, Note, Did She Ask for It?: The
"Unwelcome" Requirement in Sexual Harassment Cases, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 1558, 1571-
72 (1992) (discussing departures from the unwelcomeness requirement in Third and
Ninth Circuits). The majority opinion in Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 114 S. Ct. 367
(1993), reaffirms the unwelcomeness requirement in passing. See id. at 369.
' See Hadsell, supra note 110, at 10-11 (discussing a claimant's sensitivity to such
allegations).
' See, e.g., Meritor, 477 U.S. at 68-69 (approving lower court's decision to admit
into evidence testimony about claimaint's "'dress and personal fantasies'" (quoting
Vinson v. Taylor, 753 F.2d 141, 146 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1985)).
' There will always remain the possibility of a complainant who, out of animus
or perhaps mental instability, brings a charge of sexual harassment based on conduct
that was genuinely welcome at the time, or that simply never happened. Professor
Estrich argues that this scenario is very rare, and attributes its persistence in the
public mind to sexism. See Susan Estrich, Sex at Work, 43 STAN. L. REV. 813, 815-16
& n.5 (1991). She draws an analogy between sexual harassment and rape. See id. at
850-51. Goingfurther, MacKinnon suggests that concern about false claims maystem
"from a perception that this cause of action challenges the whole structure of sexual
subordination." MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 98. More data are needed. Although
the subject of false claims of rape has been studied empirically, I found nothing
comparable in the area of workplace sexual harassment; thus, in off-the-record
interviews, I sought the opinion of several individuals with investigation experience.
They responded that false claims are indeed very rare, and that the false claims they
knew of were brought by employees who had recently been disciplined or terminated.
See also Sandroff, supra note 176, at 69 (reporting that a majority of Fortune 500
executives surveyed agreed that most harassment complaints they receive are valid).
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appropriate kind of discrimination, then an overture, always
necessary to start a relationship, can also be appropriate. Even
when no relationship follows from an overture, a recipient might
have enjoyed the chance, or perhaps the flattering message she
might infer from the approach. 2. 7 Other types of sexual conduct-
jokes, displays, statements-that cannot be construed as courtship
deserve less respect; but some workers welcome them. Thus the
exceptional proof requirement has a basis in reality, but it has the
effect of blaming the victim; it falls to recognize that a harassed
person might hope to ease tension by treating the harassment
lightly. This approach also crudely divides women along an
infamous axis: either she asked for it or she did not, the overtures
were either welcome or unwelcome, either she or the putative
harasser is to blame.
2 38
In general, Europeans seem somewhat less confident than
Americans of their ability to draw this distinction accurately. Much
of their skepticism and reluctance may originate from an inadequate
commitment to feminism. Some of it may have another origin.
Europeans, generally speaking, are more likely to believe that
outsiders, particularly courts of law, are ill-qualified to sort out the
merits of all but the simplest sexually charged situations. 239 They
generally regard fault in this context as murky and difficult to
determine.
2 7 It is more likely that she found the message offensive. Gutek writes that
although women usually find propositions at work to be insulting, the idea that
overtures are welcome or flattering to women is nonetheless widely held, even among
women. See GUTEK, supra note 229, at 96-99.
2 One commentator offers a doctrinal solution to this problem. She suggests
that sexual conduct in the workplace be viewed as "presumptively unwelcome,"
thereby shifting the burden of persuasion to the defendant to show that a claimant
invited the sexual conduct, after the claimant has proved that the conduct at issue
occurred. Jolynn Childers, Note, Is There a Place for a Reasonable Woman in the Law?
A Discussion of Recent Developments in Hostile Environment Sexual Harassment, 42 DUKE
L.J. 854, 862 n.29 (1993). While such a change in doctrine would represent progress,
it would also retain a focus on welcomeness that does not serve plaintiffs well, and
its impact in practice would be slight. See supra note 205 (identifying a mild trend
toward an easier burden of proof for plaintiffs in sexual harassment cases).
2"9 See, e.g., Wileman v. Minilec Eng'g Ltd., [1988] I.R.L.R. 144. Although Mr.
Justice Popplewell rejected the defense argument that the claimant's having posed in
a salacious tabloid photo was relevant to the question of whether she had suffered
from the defendant's prurient remarks, see id. at 7, he also deemed irrelevant the
plaintiff's evidence that the defendant had made similar remarks to other female
employees, see id. at 10. Many Americans would likely consider both of these points
pertinent to a claim of harassment and feel confident that they could use them to
help reach determinations of fault.
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Fault is a simple issue to those who view the workplace as an
arena of domination, subordination, sexual privilege, and brute
force-if a woman complains, the man is at fault; fault is also a
simple issue to those who believe male perquisites should be
unbounded. But these views are too far from the mainstream to
help decide cases. Americans disagree on how asexual the work-
place ought to be. The issue of welcomeness, for example, is often
difficult to resolve for those who do not believe that sexual
communication between supervisors and subordinates is inherently
coercive. In this ideological middle-ground, an outsider mightjudge
that some employee regarded her supervisor's conduct with a
mixture of pleasure and anxiety. Or an employee might accept an
overture with the belief that, overall, acceptance would be prefera-
ble to rejection, without even asking herself whether she is being
coerced.2 40 Another possible scenario is the welcome advance that
becomes unwelcome later.241 Easy cases make for easy blame, but
one prominent feminist criticism of current American case law is
that it apparently recognizes as harassment only the easiest
cases.242  A meaningful remedy for sexual harassment must
acknowledge the existence of lesser but still significant harms.
While the legal system slowly attempts to locate blame and pin
it down, American working women are absorbing much of this
criticism themselves. One study found that many harassed women
blamed themselves for poor work when harassment made their work
suffer, they blamed themselves for poor evaluations when these
evaluations were punishment for not cooperating with the harass-
ment, and they sometimes came to believe that prior good evalua-
tions were based on their physical attractiveness rather than
skill.24' Another study found that a majority of both men and
women think that women dress to be sexually attractive at work and
that if a person is propositioned at work, he or she could have done
240 See Vhay, supra note 114, at 345-46 (discussing the complex nature of unwilling
submission to sexual advances, wherein the victim may be "choosing the lesser of two
evils: enduring harassment or suffering the consequences").
241 See Apruzzese, supra note 206, at 334 (offering the example of a voluntary
office relationship that has ended).
1
42 See Estrich, supra note 236, at 847 (arguing that hostile-environment case law
has shielded "all but the most extremely offensive workplaces" from the possibility of
liability); Pollack, supra note 2, at 69-70 (declaring that while courts are curbing the
most outrageous behavior, sexual harassment remains a workplace menace).
241 See Joy A. Livingston, Responses to Sexual Harassment on the Job: Lega4
Organizationa, and Individual Actions, 38J. Soc. IssuEs 5, 16-17 (1982).
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something to prevent the proposition.244  Corporate managers
reported in an early survey that they expected good female
employees to handle whatever harassment they may encounter.
245
Judges have taken the trouble to write about the objectionable traits
of female complainants.2 46
When I first decided to write this Article in November 1992, the
media were reporting similar chastisement. Anita Hill was continu-
ing to be called a perjurer, a dupe, an insane person, a publicity
hound, and a woman scorned for having accused Clarence Thomas
of sexual harassment, notwithstanding the lack of evidence to
support these accusations. 247 A female federal judge, in a speech,
deplored the fuss that women make over sexual harassment and
implied that this publicity, more than harassment itself, has
poisoned the workplace for women. 24' David Mamet, one of the
most gifted American playwrights of the day, declared that claims
of sexual harassment are a weapon of the forces of political
correctness.249 It is not a coincidence that the United States has
both the most advanced sexual harassment doctrine in the world
and also the world's most varied, numerous, famous, and successful
victim-blamers.
Several American victims of harassment, of course, have escaped
character assassination, disbelief, and self-blame; many plaintiffs
244 See GUTEK, supra note 229, at 98.
245 See Collins & Blodgett, supra note 2, at 90 (citing a 1980joint survey between
Harvard Business Review and Redbook magazine, in which a majority of male managers
agreed or partly agreed with the statement "a smart woman employee ought to have
no trouble handling an unwanted sexual approach").
246 See, e.g., Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 584 F. Supp. 419, 426 (E.D. Mich. 1984)
(characterizing the losing plaintiff, Vivienne Rabidue, as "rude and uncooperative"),
aff'd, 805 F.2d 611, 615 (6th Cir. 1986) (stating that Rabidue was "a capable,
independent, ambitious, aggressive, intractable, and opinionated individual ... a
troublesome employee"), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987); Halpert v. Wertheim &
Co., 27 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 21, 27 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (rejecting Title VII sexual
discrimination claim brought by "independent, aggressive, and successful" plaintiff).
247 SeeJane Mayer &Jill Abramson, The Surreal Anita Hill, THE NEW YORKER, May
24, 1993, at 90 (reviewing DAVID BROCK, THE REAL ANITA HILL: THE UNTOLD STORY
(1993)).
248 "'Many of these accusations are, in anybody's book, frivolous.... Frivolous
accusations reduce, if not eliminate, not only communication between men and
women but any kind of playfulness and banter. Where has the laughter gone?'"
David Margolick, At the Bar, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 1992, at B20 (quoting speech by
Judge Maryanne Trump Barry).
249 See Playwright of Oaths and Testosterone, THE INDEP., July 3, 1993, at 16
(describing Mamet's play, Oleanna, as written "in response to what he sees as the
McCarthyite feminist witch-hunt of sexual harassment legislation and political correct-
ness").
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have been vindicated. 250 Moreover, the great awareness of sexual
harassment that exists in America might be worth the price of more
turmoil and less psychic peace. The fault-based civil liability system
is not a failure. But because it coexists with cultural misogyny, this
system can contribute its own harm to victims of sexual harassment.
In a society that holds women responsible-and often culpable-for
the consequences of sex, faultfinding in sexual harassment cases will
often lead to the blaming of victims.
251
American moral outrage has taught, and continues to teach, the
world about what harms women. The cost of the lesson has been
overreliance on fault as a source of ultimate truth. To be proper
accusers, claimants must present themselves as without sin-a
requirement that has little to do with the reality of sexual harass-
ment in the workplace. Even where complainants appear unim-
peachable, courts and individual onlookers are reluctant to apply to
harassers the blunt instrument of faultfinding.
A pluralistic, eclectic approach to preventing and remedying
sexual harassment would require turning away from the American
attempt to wield moral authority and would partially deprive victims
of the comforting chance to fix blame on a wrongdoer. But this
comfort is an illusion for many victims. They might be better
served, and better understood, if the legal system would borrow
some European skepticism regarding fault. Although this posture
can have the effect of condoning exploitation and abuse, it is also
0 See, e.g., Sharon W. Walsh, SEC Agrees to Outside Review in Sexual Harassment
Case, WASH. POST, June 17, 1988, at Al (discussing court-approved settlement
awarding plaintiff back pay with interest, attorneys' fees, promotion to a higher
government-service grade, the choice of a new position in one of two offices, the
removal of negative evaluations from her personnel file, and a permanent injunction
against retaliation); see also Apruzzese, supra note 206, at 336 (describing $3.1 million
jury verdict for two police officers, $500,000 settlement for college coach, and
$250,000 punitive damages award for stockbroker).
2" A related point concerns the success of male plaintiffs against female
defendants in cases involving sexual harassment. One of the largest recoveries in
sexual harassment history was the million-dollar verdict that a man won in his suit
against a female supervisor. See Lauren Blau, Man Awarded $1 Million for Allegations
of Sexual Harassment by Woman Boss, L.A. DAILYJ., May 20, 1993, at 2. In Britain,
during the era of the £10,000 cap on amounts recoverable in industrial tribunals for
sexual harassment, seesupra note 112, one man was awarded £150,000 for defamation
from a woman who had accused him of sexual harassment. See Adam Sage, Slander
Award is No Surprise to Libel Lawyers, THE INDEP., Oct. 26, 1991, at 3. One need not
deny the harm that these male plaintiffs suffered to question whether men's and
women's dignitary interests receive equal respect in the courts, and, if these
disparities are typical, to infer ajudicial tendency toward holdingwomen responsible
for sex in the workplace.
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skeptical that a woman "asked" for anything by wearing a short
skirt.
252
3. Non-Fault Responses to the Problem of Sexual
Harassment in Europe
While in the United States several firms and women's groups
have devised extrajudicial responses to sexual harassment, 253 in
Europe these responses are more prominent. Non-fault approaches
comport with the wider European vision of sexual harassment
described above: a problem linked to other concepts rather than to
an actionable wrong. More than their liberal-feminist American
counterparts, Europeans have faith in informal techniques as
remedies for sexual harassment. The EG Code of Practice officially
endorses informal methods as well, and urges prevention; in some
ways, the EG Code is a more vital and useful document than its
American cousin, the EEOC guidelines. Trade unions also play a
role among the non-fault responses to sexual harassment, although
this role has not yet matured.
a. The Formal/Informal Distinction
Europeans have honed the concept of the "informal" approach
to sexual harassment complaints. By contrast, in American law, a
serious distinction between formal and informal procedures, with
an attendant argument that both can be of use, is often regarded
with suspicion;254 and much of this uneasiness comes from femi-
nist quarters."' The venerated Due Process Clause of the Four-
252 See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 74, at 15 ("Having read all the reported American
cases brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act and all the UK cases brought
before Industrial Tribunals, my distinct impression is that questions of purported
'provocation' arise much less frequently in the UK.").
253 See, e.g., Bowman, supra note 30, at 571 (describing attempts to educate women
in self-help measures); see also Kara Swisher, Laying Down the Law on Harassment,
WASH. POST, Feb. 6, 1994, at HI, H5 (describing strategies that experts recommend
to employers, including a written anti-harassment policy, clear definitions of sexual
harassment, and training programs).
" Perhaps the reason lies in the history of the nation as the world's first
government to announce its repudiation of hereditary privilege and courtly pomp.
Cf. U.S. CONST., art. I, § 9, cl. 8 (forbidding government to bestow titles of nobility
and expressing disapproval of foreign gifts and titles bestowed on officers of the
United States). Accordingly, there is no need to respect the concept of informality,
since formality, its opposite, has been reconceived as the procedures demanded by
due process guarantees.255 See LENOREJ. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED SOCIAL
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teenth Amendment equates procedural formality with protection
from arbitrariness. 256  But if informal procedures need not dis-
place formal ones, attention to European innovation in this area can
improve the position of persons vulnerable to sexual harassment.
A primary European contribution is a distinction between
informal and formal methods of resolving harassment complaints.
According to a Dutch expert, an informal method refrains from
trying to judge the validity of the complaint of harassment, whereas
a formal method points toward the goal of determining fault.
257
An employee who wants only that the harassment stop and who has
no interest in official blame would prefer an informal approach to
a formal one. Such a preference is likely to be found in cases where
a fault-based inquisition has not yet caused the employee to suffer,
or where the objectionable conduct is not quite outrageous. Many
victims of sexual harassment do not want to wield the sword of
fault, to choose between doing nothing and acting affirmatively to
cause another worker to be punished.
A peril of informal methods, however, is that they may leave the
victim, the harasser, and the firm without guidance. Without
elaboration, the meaning of "informal methods" remains unknown.
Moreover, just as a person can commit harassment without animus
or even awareness of harm, a victim may attempt informal self-help
alone, without advice, in an effort unintelligible to the perpetrator
or the firm. Europeans have made an effort to say what informal
methods are. "An informal settlement," according to the official
guide accompanying the EC Code of Practice, "seeks to remedy the
situation by directly confronting the harasser or by going through
AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN AMERICA 310-18 (1985)
(arguing that women are at a disadvantage when marital property is divided by
negotiation between the spouses); Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process
Dangers for Women, 100 YALE L.J. 1545, 1549-50 (1991) (arguing that "the rigid
orthodoxy" required by mediation harms women); cf. Judith Resnik, Housekeeping:
The Nature and Allocation of Work in Federal Trial Courts, 24 GA. L. REV. 909, 953-64
(1990) (pointing out connections between belittling terminology such as "housekeep-
ing" and the belittling of women in civil procedure). One writer identifies a "taste for
cooperation" in women that disadvantages them in negotiations and thus in their
ownership of property. See Carol M. Rose, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing
Ground, 78 VA. L. REV. 421, 428 & n.26 (1992).
' See generally Owen M. Fiss, Out of Eden, 94 YALE L.J. 1669, 1672-73 (1985)
(criticizing alternative dispute resolution movement for slighting procedural rights).
1 See Ineke M. de Vries, Informal Methods of Resolving Problems 2 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author). "In principle," she emphasizes, "the
person who is harassed decides whether a complaint is to be handled formally or
informally." Id.
12811994]
1282 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 142:1227
an intermediary." 2 ' Although not a precise definition, it is a
workable one, indicating the goal of cessation rather than fault-
finding.
More precision is evident in an informal device used in England
called "the challenge technique," whereby a complainant, accompa-
nied by a friendly co-worker, confronts the harasser and says that
she finds the behavior objectionable. 259 The challenge technique
is informal in that it does not aim at finding fault, yet formal in that
detailed written descriptions of the procedure are available for
recipients of harassment and their advisor-companions. The
suggested actions resemble regulations: the claimant is advised to
put on paper what behavior she finds offensive and what she hopes
to achieve in the meeting. She enlists the aid of a friend. She asks
to be heard in full, then listens. She is advised that if at any time
during the meeting the friend calls a recess, she is to leave without
protest. After the meeting, she takes notes.26 Unlike most of the
infinite other types of informal methods, the challenge technique
has a name and written ground rules.
Perhaps the most salient characteristic of the European informal
approach is that it views the participation of third parties as central
to a resolution. While the fault model aligns victim against
harasser, or accuser against accused, European informal methods as
described always involve other participants. "Confidential counsel-
ors" or "sympathetic friends" are expected to play active roles.
261
"[D]on't take on the fight single-handed," the Danish clerical
workers union warns its members; "you are bound to lose."262 In
an adversarial model, other employees of the company are viewed
in terms of deciding blame-they can be agents of the employer,
witnesses, or negligent supervisors-and they are peripheral rather
than central, the question being whether A harassed B. The bipolar
alignment is inherently formal; skepticism about fault fits more
258 RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 53. "Ifyou [the alleged harasser] are
approached informally, the aim of the meeting is to resolve the situation and to avoid
formal procedures, which might result in disciplinary action for yourself." Id. at 51
(extract from Humberside County Council [U.K.] Personal Harassment Code of
Practice).
" See Eve Featherstone, Informal Methods of Resolving Problems 2 (1993)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author).
260 See id. app. 1.
261 See RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 57.
262 Id. at 53 (citing How to Deal With Sexual Harassment?, a publication of HK, the
Danish clerical workers union).
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consistently with an informal approach and a larger stage with many
players.
Informal methods do not offer the harassed worker the
American jackpot of money damages and favorable publicity, but,
of course, this prize eludes almost all Americans as well. Most
harassed workers do not dream of a windfall. One European
researcher found that sex discrimination claimants "will not want
financial compensation, but rather a termination of the discrimina-
tory act or acts."263 Some recipients of harassment ask for even
less-an "ear," impartial attention to their story from a sympathetic
outsider, or reassurance that they are not oversensitive or crazy.
26
Many will complain only to intimates;265 and, it can be assumed,
many accounts of harassment have never been told to anyone. Thus
even "informal" channels can look dauntingly formal to harassed
workers, who are in need of a wider range of complaint options
than they may now have in the United States.
b. Emphasizing Prevention: The Commission Recommendation
The Code of Practice, discussed above, stresses prevention over
the formal resolution of disputes. In mild language, the Code
recommends that employers act to prevent sexual harassment in
several ways. Employers are urged to issue a policy statement
condemning sexual harassment and to communicate this policy to
all employees. Employees should also be told that they have an
enforceable right to be treated with dignity; managers should
receive special training in the subject. 26 6  Because preventive
measures will not always work, employers should designate someone
to provide advice and assistance to employees who complain about
sexual harassment. In addition to informal methods for dispute
resolution, a formal grievance procedure should exist, and it should
provide an alternative in case circumstances make formal grievance
proceedings unsuitable. Employers are expected to view violation
of their sexual harassment policies as a disciplinary offense.
267
2 3 FERDINAND VON PRONDZYNSKI, IMPLEMENTATION OF THE EQUALITY DIRECTIVES
§ 7, at 34 (1987).
24 Interview with Anne Simpson, Acting Coordinator, Women Against Sexual
Harassment, in London, England (July 20, 1993).
265 Interview with Maureen Rooney, National Women's Officer, Amalgamated
Engineering and Electrical Union, in London, England (July 8, 1993).21 See Recommendation and Code, supra note 59, at 5-6.
267 See id. at 7.
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The tone of the entire Code is moderate; nowhere does it tell
anyone-employer, trade union, or member state-that it must do
anything.
American comparativists should not dismiss the Code of
Practice, however, simply because it lacks sanctions and binding
force. A look at the American experience shows some potential for
the Code. In the United States, the promulgation of the 1980
EEOC Guidelines combined with the Meitor decision probably
encouraged many employers to create sexual harassment poli-
cies.26 The Guidelines do not bind federal courts, although in
practice they have been influential; 269 even less do they impose a
direct duty on employers to take steps against sexual harassment.
Yet they have helped to change the landscape of American employ-
ment. The hortatory pressure of a formal Commission recom-
mendation may approximate, as closely as possible, the indirect
pressure of the Guidelines in the United States.
270
The Code of Practice also deserves American attention because
of its progressive definition of sexual harassment: "[u]nwanted
conduct of a sexual nature, or other conduct based on sex affecting
the dignity of women and men at work. This can include unwel-
come physical, verbal, or non-verbal conduct."27 This definition,
although not prettily written, in some ways outshines both its
American counterpart and other European phrases. Unlike the
American EEOC definition, the Code's language covers the situation
where a harasser treats workers with contempt because they are
women, although without resorting to conduct of "a sexual
nature." 272  Unlike definitions on the law books in European
2  See Lipper, supra note 85, at 337 (noting that many American employers have
imported "the language of the EEOC Guidelines into their formally promulgated
policies" on sexual harassment).
269 See, e.g., Meritor Say. Bank v. Vinson, 477 U.S. 57, 65 (1986) (praising
Guidelines as "a body of experience and informed judgment").
210 It is always difficult to tell, in hindsight, which pressures made a difference and
which merely accompanied change. For future exploration of this problem, consider
Japan. In a 1993 news story, spokespersons for three major Japanese companies-
Sony, Yamaichi Securities (which, in a well-publicized incident, refused to reprimand
male employees who peeked into the women's bath at a firm retreat), and Mitsubishi
Trading Company-all declared that the firms had no sexual harassment policies and
no intention of creating any. See Merrill Goozner,Japan Discovers Sex Harassment, CHI.
TRIB.,Jan. 31, 1993, § 1, at 26. Eventually, Japanese employers will relent, and the
change of their posture may shed light on the question of what makes companies
begin to care about sexual harassment.
271 See Recommendation and Code, supra note 59, at 4 (citation omitted).
27 Guidelines, supra note 37, at 74, 677. Americanjudges have decided that this
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nations, the Code acknowledges the existence of hostile-environ-
ment harassment. Although these improvements are small and
technical, they illustrate the larger benefit of pluralism: more
definitions eventually lead to greater precision in identifying harms.
c. Trade Union Involvement: A Developing Role
The Code of Practice encourages trade unions to help remedy
sexual harassment at an early stage, 271 thereby tapping a European
resource. Because workers enjoy greater unionization, job security,
and workplace rights in Europe than in the United States, trade
union involvement can be a meaningful remedy for sexual harass-
ment.274 It would offer little to an American worker, who typically
is not a member of a union and can be terminated without
cause.275 But-this situation may change. American trade unions
have perceived the benefit to organizing that a stance against sexual
harassment provides.276 It appears safe to predict that American
unions will either continue to expand into areas of concern to
women workers, sexual harassment preeminent among them-or else
behavior falls within the conduct proscribed by the EEOC Guidelines, although to
reach this result they have had to apply the Guidelines definition beyond its literal
meaning. See, e.g., Andrews v. City of Philadelphia, 895 F.2d 1469, 1485 n.6 (3d Cir.
1990) (reading the EEOC Guidelines as illustrative examples); Hall v. Gus Constr. Co.,
842 F.2d 1010, 1014 (8th Cir. 1988) (noting that the EEOC Guidelines do not claim
to be exhaustive). An earlier interpretation had required plaintiffs to prove
"predicate acts" that were "clearly sexual in nature." Hicks v. Gates Rubber Co., 833
F.2d 1406, 1415 (10th Cir. 1987). The EEOC has tried to solve this problem by
writing new guidelines that proscribe gender-based harassment not sexual in nature.
See Guidelines on Harassment Based on Race, Color, Religion, Gender, National
Origin, Age, or Disability, 58 Fed. Reg. 51,266 (1993) (to be codified at 29 C.F.R.
§ 1609).
27S See Recommendation and Code, supra note 59, at 1.
274 This generalization holds for all EC countries except France and Spain, which
have a low rate of union membership. See INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, WORLD
LABOUR REPORT 55 (1992).
27. In Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Israel, Italy, Spain, and the
United Kingdom, according to a comparative study, termination of employment
requires good cause, usually a serious breach of "trust and interpersonal cooperation
on which the employment relationship is based." HOYT N. WHEELER & JAQUES
RojoT, WORKPLACE JUSTICE: EMPLOYMENT OBLIGATIONS IN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVE 367 (1992). This standard is roughly equivalent to the rights of the 16%
of American workers who are union members. See id. at 367-70.
2"6 Departing from their nineteenth-century history of resistance to the rights of
working women, see FARLEY, supra note 65, at 29-34, trade unions have become
engaged in feminist causes. A Supreme Court case involving women's workplace
rights, UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187 (1991), was brought by a trade
union.
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disappear. 277 Should these unions come back to health, attention
to European experience may permit a powerful combination of
American innovation and European trade-union strength.
Unlike her American counterpart, in most European countries
an aggrieved worker can take her story to a union representative or
official. 27s She states her complaint, and then together with the
union representative, tries to resolve the problem through negotia-
tions with management. Because the employer cannot, as in the
United States, simply fire the harasser or the aggrieved worker
without some trouble, incentive exists to reach a peaceful settle-
ment.
European experts indicate that trade unions have thus far not
taken the lead in preventing or remedying sexual harassment, but
they expect a stronger role to evolve.2 79 Union leaders are begin-
ning to be educated about the magnitude of sexual harassment
through the increased presence of women's officers at the national
level, especially in the wealthier nations of northern Europe.
Moreover, unlike many other items on the trade union agenda,
sexual harassment has "usually proved to be an area of cooperation
and consensus rather than a source of conflict between both sides
of industry."2 ° Given that unions are likely to stay healthy in Eu-
rope, at least in the near term,281 and given also that education
efforts have met with very little backlash within the male leadership
of the unions, 282 there is every reason to think that trade unions
will expand their territory in this area.
Until a strong role for the trade union develops, its principal
benefit to harassed workers is its separate status in the workplace:
2
7 See William Serrin, Women Are Turning to Collective Action as a Key to Power and
Protection, N.Y. TIME, Jan. 31, 1985, at C14 (quoting labor leaders).
2"8 Stories of sexual harassment can reach union officials by other means as well.
Maureen Rooney, the official with chief responsibility for sexual harassment issues in
the Amalgamated Engineering and Electrical Union in Britain, has heard of much
workplace sexual harassment not from aggrieved female workers, but from friendly
male colleagues, who phone to say that a woman is being harassed "and I told her to
complain, but she won't." Interview with Maureen Rooney, supra note 265.
219 See id.; Telephone Interview with Ineke M. de Vries, supra note 73.
280 RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 34.
281 European unions made substantial gains in membership during the 1970s and
then lost millions of members in the 1980s; as of the early 1990s, union membership
was either stable or slightly on the increase in OECD nations (24 industrialized
countries, including all twelve member nations of the EC). See INTERNATIONAL
LABOUR OFFICE, supra note 274, at 55-56.
282 Interview with Michael Rubenstein, Consultant to the European Commission,
in Surrey, England (July 5, 1993).
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283a source of power apart from individuals and management.
When unionized, workers have for their use an organization
dedicated to eliminating dangers in the workplace, documenting the
history of workers so that individuals need not start from ground
zero in redressing their injuries, and amplifying complaints that are
well founded. This description is, of course, an ideal not widely
shared in the United States, as the 1984 presidential election result
attests.284 In Europe, however, the ideal has vitality for workers;
it may yet flourish in the American future.
III. THE PROMISE AND LIMITS OF SYNTHESIS
American initiative and European skepticism can combine to
produce useful new perspectives on the problem of sexual harass-
ment. As noted in the Introduction, cultural differences and
contrary value choices in America and Europe preclude one
universally appropriate synthesis. The suggestions I offer in this
Part are some of the many possibilities available. Arguing always in
favor of pluralism rather than a centralized approach, I illustrate in
Section A one combination where Americans can avail themselves
of European lessons. Section B adds other possible applications of
the comparativist approach and discusses its benefits and dangers.
A. The Third American Paradigm: Sexual Harassment as
Detrimental Workplace Conditions
American approaches to sexual harassment reflect two major
paradigms; or, put another way, workplace sexual harassment may
be seen as an important subcategory of two sociolegal concerns.
One of these is the subjugation and dominance of women by men.
In this first paradigm, workplace sexual harassment becomes sex-
2"5 The argument in favor of regulatory "tripartism," where a union or other
organization plays a role in the relationship between regulator and regulated, rests
in part on the belief that unions can provide "an information base for the weaker
party" and a "power base" to accomplish what rights-rhetoric alone cannot. IAN
AYRES & JOHN BRAITHWAITE, RESPONSIvE REGULATION: TRANSCENDING THE
DEREGULATION DEBATE 59 (1992).
284 Walter Mondale, strongly supported by organized labor, was defeated by the
incumbent, President Ronald Reagan, who had destroyed the PATCO air-traffic
controllers union in 1981 during his first term in office. "Landslide" is a term
frequently invoked to describe Reagan's 1984 victory. See Tom Wicker, In the Nation:
After 1984, What?, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 23, 1984, at A35 (noting that "Reagan's landslide
defeat of Walter Mondale" forced Democrats to reexamine their future political
strategy).
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based employment discrimination, and Title VII provides suitable
focuses and remedies. The second paradigm, an alternative or
complement to the first, perceives sexual harassment as extremely
rude, essentially private conduct between employees-conduct that
is sometimes, but not generally, attributable to a heedless employer.
According to the second paradigm, the appropriate remedy lies in
tort law.
Europeans and the European Community have not fully
accepted either paradigm, although they have shown more approval
of the first one. While sexual harassment as sex discrimination has
taken hold in British case law" 5 and achieved partial endorsement
at the Community level and in scattered sites around the conti-
nent,28 some rejection of the idea has also taken place. 287 Mean-
while, tort-based, private-law remedies-the approach that can be
seen as most American-continue to go unused in Europe. 28 8 To
an American observer, this result may seem odd. Is Europe feminist
or antifeminist? In American scholarship, the two paradigms divide
fairly neatly along a feminist axis, with the sex-discrimination
paradigm demanding a degree of allegiance to radical feminism.
28 9
Tort theorists such as Paul and Epstein, who have written candidly
about their aversion to radical feminism, 210 favor a wrongful-
conduct approach. By most indicators, Europe seems to lag behind
285 See supra notes 83-86 and accompanying text.
28 See supra notes 86-88 and accompanying text; see also text accompanying note
94 (describing partial acceptance of sex discrimination concept at Commission).
287 See supra text accompanying note 89 (describing Portuguese rejection); cf supra
note 127 (noting French decision to criminalize quid pro quo harassment, rejecting
broader possibilities).2
1
8 See supra part II.B.1.
289 By "radical" I refer to commitment to fundamental change, from the roots.
The sex-discrimination paradigm is radical because it condemns an entire social
condition and views women and men as players in a historical, political drama. A tort
approach, by contrast, regards the players as individuals and pays little attention to
root causes in society.
o See Paul, supra note 21, at 347-48; see also EPSTEIN, supra note 21, at 271-74.
Here I reject the cynical speculation that Paul and Epstein have no real commitment
to a tort approach but merely want to stop Title VII because it offers a practical
remedy to injured women. There is little, if any, basis for this conclusion. Epstein,
a leading torts scholar, does want to stop Title VII, but he has been advocating a vital
role for private-law civil liability for more than twenty years. See Richard A. Epstein,
A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. LEGAL STUD. 151 (1973). Paul comes to the problem
of sexual harassment from the vantage point of "individual responsibility," a
background that would lead her sincerely to reject group-based conceptions ofsexual
harassment. See ELLEN F. PAUL, EQUITY AND GENDER: THE COMPARABLE WORTH
DEBATE 127-29 (1989).
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in its commitment to feminism, yet when faced with competing
American alternatives, it has manifested a preference for the more
radical-feminist of the two.
Because a feminist/antifeminist matrix is inadequate to explain
the European choice, another theory becomes necessary. I contend
that the relative success of the sex-discrimination paradigm is best
explained by its collectivist-as contrasted to individualist-focus.
The sex-discrimination paradigm focuses on the workplace as an
organism and sees people in terms of their group membership. It
is, of course, more consistent with European skepticism about fault
than the wrongful-conduct paradigm. Stronger trade unions and
multipolar participation in problems of harassment also comport
with this collectivist perspective.
The next extension of the argument is that the sex-discrimi-
nation paradigm has succeeded only partially in Europe because it
is insufficiently group-oriented. Consider where the success has
lain: primarily at the Community level, where institutions agree
that, in principle, sexual harassment is sex discrimination. Few
plaintiffs have prevailed with this notion, but the Community has
demonstrated a serious interest in eradicating sexual harassment via
its fully-accepted equal treatment law. The sex discrimination
paradigm, as I view it, lies midway between the wrongful-conduct
paradigm and a distant, theoretical ideal where sexual harassment
is prevented and remedied without litigation.
Thus, I offer another paradigm, beyond sex discrimination:
sexual harassment as detrimental workplace conditions, to be cured
with devices other than litigation.29 1 I emphasize as strongly as I
can that, although I put forward this thought as a recommendation
for change, I think that access to the courts should always be a vital
"' Contrast the language of Title VII, which prohibits sex discrimination in
"terms, conditions, or privileges of employment." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (1988).
This third paradigm makes no reference to actionable discrimination. It perceives
hostile-environment sexual harassment as an environment, an ambient condition.
Two colleagues helped me fashion this concept. Stephen Sugarman first
suggested the tripartite schema. Marty Malin pointed out that, despite references in
the EEOC Guidelines and the statute, Title VII is not aimed fundamentally at curing
detrimental workplace conditions, and that UAWv.Johnson Controls, Inc. illustrates the
point. In Johnson Controls, the Supreme Court held that a fetal protection policy that
barred women from jobs hazardous to their reproductive health was sex discrimi-
nation. See UAW v.Johnson Controls, Inc., 499 U.S. 187, 197-200 (1991). The Court
thus permitted the company to continue its detrimental workplace conditions, which
incidentally, Professor Malin adds, were more of a barrier to women's employment
than the fetal protection policy.
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option for victims of sexual harassment. With this "third American
paradigm," I do not argue for the abolition of any formal remedies
currently available. 29 2  The paradigm of detrimental workplace
conditions is offered rather in an effort to improve the perception
of sexual harassment as it really exists, with no intent to gainsay the
wrongful-conduct or sex discrimination paradigms.
1. The Domain of the Paradigm
The detrimental-conditions approach is both wider and narrower
than the two other paradigms, as I detail below.
a. Elimination of the Quid Pro Quo/Hostile-Environment Dichotomy
The traditional division between quid pro quo harassment and
hostile-environment harassment is ready for reexamination. It rests
on a now unrealistic view of the workplace. After the rapid growth
of sexual harassment law in the United States and its attendant
publicity, almost every person savvy enough to acquire power at
work knows better than to fulfill the prima facie requirements for
quid pro quo harassment. 293 If a supervisor wants simply to have
sex, then crude demands backed by explicit threats are risky and
counterproductive. This is not to say that traditional quid pro quo
harassment does not happen in the workplace-only that it is by now
virtually deviant behavior. 294 Moreover, the isolation of quid pro
quo harassment makes no sense to many women, who may hear a
tacit threat in even a polite overture from someone who can fire or
discipline them. To some, even classic hostile-environment
situations-involving sexually explicit pinups, for example, or
obscene name-calling-look like men threatening women.
295
' Although a nice idea in theory, in practice remedies tend to compete for the
same turf. For my general thoughts on this conflict, see supra text accompanying
notes 168-72; for suggestions on resolving it, see infra part III.A.4.
13 The quid pro quo plaintiff must prove that an actual threat existed and that the
detriment she suffered was causally related to her response to the threat. See Estrich,
supra note 236, at 834. This burden makes "all but the most perfect plaintiffs unable
to establish the requisite nexus, and all but the most perfectly stupid defendants able
to rebut successfully a prima facie case." Id.
'Cf. Torrey, supra note 231, at 57 n.17 (noting trend away from "overt
expressions of sexual aggression" and tendency of harassers to adapt to new
technology, using electronic mail, answering machines, and computer software as
media of harassment).
2" For illustrative cases, see Sparks v. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 830 F.2d 1554,
1556 (1 lth Cir. 1987) (involving threats of reprisal from a male supervisor to a female
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Regardless of the descriptive value of a quid pro quo category,
however, the detrimental-conditions paradigm is not concerned with
the relatively rare incidents of harassment that fall squarely within
the label. Thus, the detrimental workplace conditions paradigm of
sexual harassment-to merge the Code of Practice and EEOC
definitions-covers conduct based on sex that has the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work
performance or creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive
working environment. Some variations of quid pro quo harassment
will fall within this definition, but the paradigm focuses on
conditions of employment rather than the fault-laden concepts of
abuse of power, extortion, or sexual blackmail.
b. Emphasis on the Workplace
As mentioned previously, sexual harassment takes place in a
variety of settings.29 The wrongful-conduct paradigm is uncon-
cerned with a workplace/nonworkplace distinction; the sex-
discrimination paradigm applies only to workplace discrimination.
Even more than the sex-discrimination paradigm, the detrimental
workplace conditions paradigm is sited only in the workplace.
297
The sex-discrimination paradigm connects sexual harassment
with broader discrimination. Within this paradigm, harassment on
the job is an expression of the evil of inequality that civil rights
legislation in general sought to eradicate. The harassed worker
suffers a detriment because of her sex. This detriment is related to
the harassment she may experience in the street, the lower pay she
likely receives, the unequal educational opportunities she may have
had, and the lesser power she may have in her intimate relationships
with men. The detrimental workplace conditions paradigm, by
employee who spurned his repeated sexual advances); Jeppsen v. Wunnicke, 611 F.
Supp. 78, 83 (D. Alaska 1985) (refusing to recognize a distinction between quid pro
quo cases and hostile work environment cases). See also GUTEK, supra note 229, at
119 (arguing that sexual harassment is sometimes used by men to encourage women
to leave a worksite); Marlisa Vinciguerra, Note, The Aftermath ofMeritor: A Search for
Standards in the Law of Sexual Harassment, 98 YALE L.J. 1717, 1718-19 (1989) (arguing
that all workplace sexual harassment invoking a threat of economic detriment is quid
pro quo harassment).
See supra note 14.
An example of a situation where the two paradigms do not overlap is the
harassing interview that takes place away from the workplace, at a job fair or
university. Title VII would probably apply, but the detrimental workplace conditions
paradigm would not.
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contrast, connects harassment to different workplace hardships:
excessive noise, poor ventilation, physical obstacles, and toxic
chemicals in the air. Neither paradigm tells the complete story of
workplace sexual harassment; both provide separate framing devices
in which the problem can be bounded.
2. Innovative Regulation
Catharine MacKinnon once wrote, rather cursorily, that hostile-
environment harassment could be perceived as a harm within the
jurisdiction of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) without doing violence to the 1970 workplace-health stat-
ute. 29 s Her proposal has received very little attention in the litera-
ture. As I have argued, the reasons for this neglect pertain to the
American conception of sexual harassment as either wrongful
conduct or sex discrimination. These two ways of seeing sexual
harassment obstruct the detrimental-conditions paradigm.
299
On further study, MacKinnon's idea appears plausible. First,
sexual harassment is, as she suggests, consistent with the language
of the statute that established OSHA.3 '0 Although there is no
evidence that Congress had sexual harassment in mind when it
sought to regulate workplace hazards, this argument has not
stopped American courts from equating sexual harassment with
discrimination outlawed by Title VII. Indeed, a statutory reference
to the "psychological factors involved"30 ' in occupational safety
and health is more than exists in the Civil Rights Act of 1964 to
support the sex-discrimination paradigm. The official purpose of
OSHA is to address the problem of workplace health and safety,
nothing narrower than that.30 2  The agency, founded only in
1973303 and altered several times by political forces since then,
29 See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 159.
' Another reason for the neglect is that American labor law is highly subspecial-
ized, so that few practitioners or academics pay equal attention to OSHA law and
sexual harassment. Moreover, the discipline was somewhat preoccupied with the task
of defending a precarious status quo during Republican presidential administrations,
when sexual harassment law was burgeoning.
sot See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 159 n.48.
"l 29 U.S.C. § 669(a)(1) (1988) (describing the scope of authorized research); see
also id. § 669(a)(4) (referring to "motivational and behavioral factors").
" "The Congress finds that personal injuries and illnesses arising out of work
situations impose a substantial burden.., in terms of lost production, wage loss,
medical expenses, and disability compensation payments." 29 U.S.C. § 651(a) (1988).
3
0
o See STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM app. 1 (1982).
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does not have a long heritage of only one approach to regulation
that would make it unable to function in this new domain.30 4 Case
law, moreover, supports a broad mandate.
0 5
Although the mandate of OSHA is broad enough to cover sexual
harassment, current practices of the agency were never tailored to
fit the problem and should not be used in this context. A "rule-
book" approach, whereby inspectors visit a worksite and impose
citations with fines attached, cannot readily be applied to sexual
harassment.30 6 Moreover, because OSHA currently has no experi-
ence in regulating sexual harassment, its personnel are unprepared
to act in this area.
Regulation of workplace sexual harassment, therefore, ought to
be innovative and flexible rather than traditional in its methods,
taking guidance from a literature written after the American
national debate on deregulation.30 7  In particular, workplace
sexual harassment is amenable to regulation where firms rather than
government decide specific standards. The role of government is
to require that these standards be written and to ensure that in
practice they work to reduce the hazard regulated. This type of
control, known in the literature as mandatory self-regulation, falls
somewhere between the traditional rulebook approach (used by
' As early as 1954, one study of workers' compensation noted how quickly
radical proposals such as this one become familiar. See HERMAN M. SOMERS & ANNE
R. SOMERS, WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION: PREVENTION, INSURANCE, AND REHABILITA-
TION OF OCCUPATIONAL DISABILITY 49-53 (1954). Even the concept of "occupational
disease," as distinguished from "industrial accidents," was once considered a bold
expansion of the effort to insure workplace safety; the authors add that early fears of
excessive liability if occupational disease were considered a workplace hazard "usually
turned out to be unsupported by the facts." Id.
" See AFL-CIO v. OSHA, 965 F.2d 962, 973 (11th Cir. 1992) (holding that OSHA
is entitled to regulate hazards that present "significant risk of material health impair-
ment"); California Stevedore & Ballast Co. v. Occupational Safety and Health Review
Comm'n, 517 F.2d 986, 988 (9th Cir. 1975) (mandating that employers must
"eliminate all foreseeable and preventable hazards").
See 29 U.S.C. §§ 657-659 (1988) (outlining OSHA regulation procedures for
inspections, citations, and penalties). Most outside assessments of OSHA's overall
performance agree that inspection and enforcement are weak points in a record that
includes some strengths (for example, occupational injuries and illness rates declined
during the 1980s). See Thomas F. Walton & James Langenfeld, Regulatory Reform
Under Reagan-The Right Way and the Wrong Way, in REGULATION AND THE REAGAN
ERA: POLITICS, BUREAUCRACY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 41, 50-55 (Roger E. Meiners
& Bruce Yandle eds., 1989).
"' See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 283; REES, supra note 26.
1994] 1293
1294 UNIVERSITYOFPENNSYLVANIALAWREVIEW [Vol. 142:1227
OSHA and other agencies) and voluntary self-regulation (used by
the American accounting profession).,s 8
Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite have outlined the virtues of
mandatory self-regulation in contrast to traditional regulatory
practices, and much of their analysis is pertinent to workplace
sexual harassment, even though this hazard has never been
regulated in the traditional government-controlled manner.
30 9
Ayres and Braithwaite argue that a company will feel a sense of
commitment to rules that it writes; when the firm has generated its
own regulations, both acceptance and execution of the rules im-
prove.1 0 The salutary effect of the EEOC Guidelines illustrates
this potential. These Guidelines spurred voluntary self-regulation
within American firms;3 11 the Code of Practice may have a similar
effect in Europe. 12 Within a detrimental workplace conditions
paradigm, the United States could take a small step further and
require firms to write and enforce rules about hostile-environment
harassment.
Another benefit of mandatory self-regulation is the likelihood
that the rules that industry creates will be innovative, responsive,
and tailored to real needs.31 1 Companies differ from one another
and will require different regulations. Judges, regulators, and
academics have their own assumptions of what workers
need-assumptions that may be grounded in dubious stereo-
types.314 As Ayres and Braithwaite point out, moreover, compa-
nies may choose to write relatively strict rules, imposing more
demands than would universalistic rules written by outsiders.
3 15
The rules themselves can be revised expeditiously as a company
needs change. Mandatory self-regulation is still new, but applica-
so8 See AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 283, at 112.
"9 See id. at 112-13.
s10 See id. at 113 (citations omitted).
511 See supra note 268 and accompanying text.
.12 See Rubenstein, Recommendation, supra note 49, at 73 (characterizing the Code
as "a strong incentive for employers to develop a proactive approach to the problem
of sexual harassment").
... See AYRES & BRAITHWAITE, supra note 283, at 113.
314 A fictional anecdote illustrates this point. In David Lodge's novel set around
an English manufacturing plant, the managing director is persuaded to put the
question of pinups to a vote among the factory workers. Somewhat to his surprise,
the workers-mostly men, many of Indian and Pakistani origin-vote to remove them.
See DAVID LODGE, NICE WORK 245 (1988).
315 See AYRES & BRAITHWArrE, supra note 283, at 111.
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tions have already emerged; workplace sexual harassment is a
suitable domain for this increasingly effective approach.
3. Expertise and Professionalization
Continuing the analogy to workplace safety, experts in work-
place sexual harassment could begin to develop professional norms
for themselves and become a community. The origins of the
American Society of Safety Engineers ("ASSE"), as described by
Joseph Rees in his study of innovative workplace regulation, can
serve in some respects as a model."' Safety engineering became
a profession in typical fashion: practitioners, dismayed by what they
saw in their ranks, sought to define themselves using standards of
exclusion.117 Experts in workplace sexual harassment, as well as
lay observers, generally believe that not everyone who gives advice
about sexual harassment is qualified to do so.318 The corporate
response to sexual harassment is still in its early stages. As the
corporate response matures, employees responsible for preventing
and remedying sexual harassment will have the opportunity to
acquire the expertise and confidence that accompany professionaliz-
ation.
Expertise in workplace sexual harassment can be the basis for a
profession because it is not a mere subcategory of another specialty,
but rather embraces and extends beyond employment discrimina-
tion law, critical legal theory, counseling, and management
principles. Again, following the lead of ASSE as described by Rees,
the profession of workplace sexual harassment experts would rest
on two separate bases. ASSE demands competence in both
engineering and management principles; 19 the professional
expert in workplace sexual harassment would by analogy be
competent in the major subtopics-law, union rules where applica-
ble, psychology, and negotiation-as well as management principles.
Ultimately, when it is ready to be formed, this profession would
consist of people who are the best able to identify, prevent, and
cure sexual harassment as it occurs in the workplace. They would
defer neither to theory nor to transient corporate indifference to
'16 See REES, supra note 26, at 88-93.
317 See id. at 89.
31' I frequently heard this observation in my interviews, although few people will
say so in print. For an on-the-record acknowledgment, see Audrey Magee, Harassment
at Work Dominates Women's Seminar, IRISH TIMES, Mar. 22, 1993, at 4.
319 See REES, supra note 26, at 92.
1994] 1295
1296 UNIVERSITY OFPENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 142:1227
the problem. Professionalization implies a degree of independence
from both feminist or antifeminist ideology, and management's
short-term priorities.
3 20
No workplace management in the world is ready to cede
autonomy to self-defined experts in sexual harassment, even though
the self-defined profession of safety engineering is widely accepted.
The analogy to engineering falters because hazards of engineering
and design are widely regarded as neutral, apolitical, and undeni-
able, while those of hostile-environment harassment are not. When
a cutting machine lacks a guard and a worker consequently loses a
finger, all would agree that the firm has a problem. Hostile-
environment harassment, however, generally implies differences of
opinion among workers. Sexual harassment looks completely
different from hazards that are conventionally explained in terms of
engineering or design.
But note what the two domains have in common. First, it is a
modern notion-a construct of post-industrial enlightenment-that
a firm must reflect on the error of its ways and make a change after
a worker is maimed by a machine. The victim of an unguarded
sharp edge in 1870, like a harassed worker in 1970, was tacitly
encouraged by an indifferent legal regime to blame himself. He
assumed the risk, as Vivienne Rabidue and others were said to have
done,3 21 or he was not free from fault, like the harassed worker
320 The drawbacks of increased professionalization are well known. See IVAN
ILLICH ET AL., DISABLING PROFESSIONS 11-41 (1977) (arguing that all professions
create dependency); cf Michael Lewis,J-School Confidential, NEw REPUBLIC, Apr. 19,
1993, at 20 (ridiculing Joseph Pulitzer for seeking to create a profession of
journalism). It is certainly possible that professional experts in sexual harassment
would prove to be pompous, foolish, obfuscatory, or simply wrong. But experience
has shown that this subject is not understood in commonsense fashion. Many people
profess to be confused about it, disagreement runs rife, and little common ground
is acknowledged. See infra part III.B.1.d. Formed slowly and with powers that would
increase only after the profession has proved itself, this entity could fill a real void.
s" See Rabidue v. Osceola Ref. Co., 805 F.2d 611, 622 (6th Cir. 1986) (holding
that in context of a society that publicly "condones" and "commercially exploits"
sexually-oriented materials, alleged harasser's "obscenities, although annoying, were
not so startling" as to affect plaintiff's psyche adversely enough for plaintiff to
prevail), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1041 (1987).
In one New York case, a woman complained that her 1924 workplace conditions
caused her to develop tuberculosis. See Wager v. White Star Candy Co., 217 N.Y.S.
173, 174 (App. Div. 1926). She received a verdict of $2000, but the Appellate
Division, reversing, held that she had encountered the injury voluntarily:
The plaintiff was fully aware of the conditions under which she worked,
and continued in the employment fromJune to December in spite of such
knowledge. It is from her testimony that we learn that the walls of the
LAW, CULTURE, AND HARASSMENT
who quit or did not quit, complained or did not complain;3 22
regardless of blame, the injury was "personal," a discrete event
between two parties.12' Neither civil liability nor workers' com-
pensation nor workplace safety regulation offered relief. Rees puts
the maiming machine in its context. His ASSE engineers ask: Why
was the guard missing? How was an unguarded machine allowed to
remain on the shop floor?124  The safety professional attributes
injury not to some pure realm of technology but rather to a flaw in
the working relationships of the firm. The distinction that some
observers would draw between the "hard," "physical" injury that
concerns workplace safety professionals and the "soft," "emotional"
injury that would concern workplace harassment professionals is
undermined by the professional beliefs of the safety engineers them-
selves.
3 25
Once seen in terms of detrimental workplace conditions, sexual
harassment could be merged into a richer concept of safety
regulation. A dialogue between safety professionals and harassment
professionals could begin to explore the ground common to both
cellar were wet to the touch; that a cesspool backed up liquids which wet the
floor; that the cellar was devoid of windows to light or air it; that dead rats
were left about; that the odors were vile; that no fires were kept in the
upstairs room; that the plaintiff worked in a drafty place; that the upstairs
room was damp. It is common knowledge that such conditions are
deleterious to health. The plaintiff was chargeable with such knowledge.
We think that the plaintiff, as a matter of law, assumed the risk attendant
upon her remaining in the employment, and that the recovery may not
stand.
Id. at 175 (citation omitted).
s" See Gary T. Schwartz, Tort Law and the Economy in Nineteenth-Century America:
A Reinterpretation, 90 YALE L.J. 1717, 1771 (1981) (identifying harsh doctrinal
limitations on ability of workers to recover for injuries); see also supra notes 211-17
and accompanying text.
S2- See, e.g., Ives v. South Buffalo Ry. Co., 201 N.Y. 271 (1911) (invalidating
workmen's compensation act on the ground that federal and state constitution
require a plaintiff to prove fault in order to justify any taking from the defendant);
Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976) (holding
that harassment was a personal matter between two employees), rev'd, 568 F.2d 1044
(3d Cir. 1977); MORTONJ. HORWrTz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1860-
1960: THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 11 (1992) (summarizing nineteenth-century
view).
121 See REES, supra note 26, at 93.
" Making a related point, the trade-union activist Stan Gray has written that in
traditionally male workplaces, attitudes toward health and safety are mingled with
tension about gender. See Gray, supra note 162, at 219-20. Some male workers,
according to Gray, will not cooperate with safety regulation because dangerous
workplace conditions reinforce their concept of "masculine superiority." Id. Safety
standards in the workplace thus reflect cultural influences.
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groups. Experts in psychological stress of the workplace, serving as
intermediaries or interpreters in this dialogue, might explain the
harms of sexual harassment. It is even possible to imagine safety
experts and harassment experts working together in a new ASSE,
where intangible and psychological harms of all kinds in the
workplace would receive attention. The detrimental workplace
conditions paradigm suggests new types of teamwork that an engi-
neer of the future might join with pride.1
26
4. Is the Paradigm Attractive to Its Constituencies?
In order to have any real-life effect, the detrimental workplace
conditions paradigm must reassure both employers and employees
that it will not unduly obstruct their interests. Employers would
oppose a change that adds regulation without a tradeoff of reduced
costs; employees would worry about the preemptive effect of a
regulatory approach. Fault-based notions of sexual harassment are
so influential that constituencies naturally identify themselves as
plaintiffs or defendants, even if they have never been involved in a
lawsuit.
The political demands of a fresh approach to workplace sexual
harassment are beyond the scope of this Article, which suggests
changes in perception rather than new distributions of power; but
even before political needs are identified, the paradigm could
become an attractive alternative for both potential plaintiffs and
potential defendants in the American fault-based system. For
employers, self-regulation offers benefits even if it will not preempt
lawsuits by employees. The primary potential benefit is that self-
regulation should result in less harassment and thus less litiga-
tion.127 But other benefits ought to emerge as well. Writing their
own rules, firms would attempt to reduce their costs, and once the
costs of sexual harassment become better documented, mandatory
self-regulation should eventually emerge as a money-saver. Innova-
tive cures for this subcategory of detrimental workplace conditions
126 Cf. Samuel Florman, Existential Pleasures of Engineering, TECH. REV., Apr. 1984,
at 6 (meditating on humanistic aspects of engineering); Michele Landsberg, Engineer
Has Designs on Feminism, TORONTO STAR, Mar. 8, 1991, at F1 (discussing increased
attention to women's issues in engineering profession).
... Because the costs of liability are far more obvious to management than "the
costs of lowered commitment and productivity, diminished job satisfaction, and
turnover," GUTEK, supra note 229, at 158, the hope of reduced litigation is of major
importance in promoting the paradigm.
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would lead to favorable publicity. Ethical investment criteria could
encourage publicly-traded companies to favor a meaningful policy.
Firms that are successful at mandatory self-regulation might, and
should, receive additional latitude concerning the regulation of
other aspects of their activity.
Although employers are entitled to assurance that mandatory
self-regulation will not impose burdens on them unilaterally without
any related benefit, employees should not have to forfeit their
current remedies in the courts. The old bargain of workers'
compensation, trading tort remedies for insurance, need not
dominate current thinking. Shared understandings have moved
forward since the creation of workers' compensation such that, for
instance, the concept of externalities is widely understood: detri-
mental workplace conditions impose social costs, and somebody has
to bear them. As comparative study tells us, furthermore, no
immutable logic demands the torts-insurance tradeoff of workers'
compensation.3 28 Eventually, a new bargain may appear fair. If
mandatory self-regulation develops a track record revealing good
faith on the part of management, yet burdensome litigation persists,
political actors might negotiate some compromise in the legislature,
making lawsuits slightly more difficult to bring.3 29 But preserving
full American access to the courts during the slow development of
this third paradigm remains important.
B. Comparison and Progress
A third American paradigm is only one application of the type
of comparativism described in the preceding Parts of this Article.
The process of comparativism itself poses independent opportuni-
ties to strengthen the American approach to workplace sexual
harassment. The improvement of legal theory and policymaking
also follows from the applied comparativism described. But this
approach poses dangers as well.
328 One researcher who studied 30 industrialized countries with workers'
compensation found that in 21 of them this form of insurance was not the sole
remedy for a jobsite injury. See C. ARTHUR WILLIAMS, JR., AN INTERNATIONAL
COMPARISON OF WORKERS' COMPENSATION 200 (1991).
"m Cf. Victor E. Schwartz & Liberty Mahshigian, National Childhood Vaccine Injury
Act of 1986: An Ad Hoc Remedy or a Window for the Future?, 48 OHIO ST. LJ. 387, 392-
93 (1987) (describing tradeoff whereby persons injured by vaccines receive no-fault
compensation in exchange for reduced opportunities available in tort lawsuits).
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1. Some Benefits of Comparativism
Ongoing comparison to Europe offers at least four sources of
improvements to Americans who seek to create a better law of
sexual harassment. It provides an encouraging example of what can
be achieved in a difficult climate, a lively federalist laboratory, a
unique lens through which to view American culture generally, and
a way out of a political impasse.
a. An Encouraging Precedent
The European experience elaborated above in Part II is
heartening for Americans because of its successes in a legal
environment that pays little official heed to the priorities of
feminism. Having learned from American initiative, European
reformers accepted the concept of hostile-environment harassment
and agreed that sexual harassment was sex discrimination. But
jurisdictional objections threatened to hamper any meaningful
improvement of European Community law. Pressed by subsidiarity
and the principle of specific attribution of powers, reformers built
associations with disparate concepts. The associations helped to
expose sexual harassment for what it really is or might be. This
tactic and accompanying intellectual revelation is available to
American reformers as well. It can build alliances with other causes,
thereby providing a renewable source of encouragement.
Arguments that sexual harassment is a threat to health and
safety, a violation of human rights, and a burden on commerce
serve several purposes. They hark back to principles of fundamen-
tal significance. They bridge the feminist cause with other causes
and show how women in the workplace are not only women but also
workers whose health and safety must be protected, human beings
with human rights, and economic actors within an international
economic union.
Occasionally Americans have achieved spectacular results using
a similar linkage. Martin Luther King, Jr., with what appeared to be
simplicity, invoked the Declaration of Independence and the United
States Constitution, and white Americans had no rebuttal.3 0
I" King was the greatest American exponent of linkage with texts as a device for
reform. See MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR., The Ethical Demands for Integration, in A
TESTAMENT OF HOPE: THE ESSENTIAL WRITINGS OF MARTIN LUTHER KING, JR. 117
(James M. Washington ed., 1986) (citing the Declaration of Independence and the
Constitution); see also DAVIDJ. GARROw, BEARING THE CROSS: MARTIN LUTHER KING,
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Although sexual harassment has always existed, the concept did not
crystallize until after readers of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act,
notably Catharine MacKinnon, called it unlawful discrimination.
3 3 1
The Civil Rights Act itself is an example of this kind of linkage: the
congressional power that permitted the law to be promulgated was
the power to regulate interstate commerce. 3 2 American civil
rights advocates, like European advocates of sexual harassment
legislation, have often gone beyond appeals to social justice and
shown the relationship between their proposed reform and
business.
333
Linkage with texts asserts that a reform does not depart from
present law; what appears to be change is indeed mandated by a
current legal tradition. When it succeeds, this linkage achieves a
political consensus, uniting those who would change with those who
would preserve. As a political strategy, of course, the tactic has its
perils. It might seem to concede that every reform proposal must
have a textual basis for purposes of jurisdiction, hampering
initiatives such as the Commission's social action programs.
Moreover, having been used in the United States by religious
fundamentalists, gun-control opponents, and antiabortion activists,
the tactic may strike feminist reformers as inherently reactionary
and dangerous. Yet it appears indispensable to reform efforts. 34
American reformers have already used linkage in their successful
effort to show that sexual harassment can be sex discrimination and
thus violative of a civil rights statute. The efforts need not stop
here. Following the European lead, proponents could link their
JR., AND THE SOUTHERN CHRISTIAN LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE 169 (1986) (discussing
King's proposal for a Second Emancipation Proclamation); DAVID L. LEWIS, KING:
A BIOGRAPHY 178 (2d ed. 1978) (quoting King's allusions to the "Hebraic-Christian
tradition" and the Constitution).
33' See MACKINNON, supra note 1, at 208-13.
332 See Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 249 (1964)
(stating that Congress based the Civil Rights Act on its power under the Fourteenth
Amendment and the Commerce Clause).3 3 See RICHARD KLUGER, SIMPLEJUSTICE 88 (1976) (describing the effect of racial
segregation on wages); Ian Ayres, Fair Driving. Gender and Race Discrimination in
Retail Car Negotiations, 104 HARv. L. REV. 817, 853-57 (1991) (describing the effects
of race and sex discrimination in unregulated retail markets).
'., The American constitutional conflict over abortion may be viewed as a problem
of unpersuasive attempts to create linkage with texts. Constitutional guarantees of
substantive due process or equal protection require a tendentious reading in order
to support a guaranteed right to abortion. The attempt to find privacy in the Bill of
Rights, though slightly easier, poses similar difficulties. See LAURENCE TRIBE,
ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 92-95 (1990).
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agenda to a variety of texts and doctrines. The connection between
sexual harassment and the cost of doing business has implications
for corporation law, including duties owed to shareholders. Tax
policymakers might consider how sexual harassment results in the
unemployment or underemployment of taxpaying workers, and its
harm to corporate profits. Health law suggests conceptual analogies
to-and pragmatic alliances with-efforts of environmentalists,
administrators, and health care cost-cutters to reduce the amount of
costly harm flowing from the workplace.
Predictably, opponents will protest that this expanded attempt
to prevent and remedy sexual harassment violates American
analogues to subsidiarity and the principle of specific attribution of
powers. These protests will often contain some truth. Especially
until better data are gathered, for example, the connection between
sexual harassment and financial harm to business will remain
controversial and, to critics, too vague to permit an extension of
financial-regulatory power. Potential allies may decline to form
alliances. Some linkages will simply be unconvincing. But the
connection between sexual harassment and other domains of law
and American society will become more and more evident, despite
the occasional lapses of the linkage technique. Sexual harassment
is a problem of money, health and safety, and morality. To isolate
it as a women's issue is not only to choose a weak tactic..5 but also
to conceal a large portion of the truth. The European experience
has identified some new alliances to be made, and it has shown the
promise of linkages created in response to jurisdictional doubt.
As the European experience suggests, decentralization is a
necessary complement to linkage. The creation of a detrimental
workplace conditions paradigm is one example of decentralization.
When seen as a problem of workplace conditions, sexual harassment
extends beyond the relatively narrow range of feminists, antidiscrim-
ination lawyers, and harassed individuals who now comprise the
majority of people interested in the subject. These groups may be
called on to give up some of their control of the sexual harassment
agenda in exchange for a greater consensus that the problem is
important. European experience offers instruction about the value
of this bargain. I have argued that in Europe decentralization
advanced the effort against sexual harassment, but one might view
the acceptance of a Community-wide recommendation rather than
335 See supra text accompanying notes 23-24, 156-60, 187-90.
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some alternative (like a directive) as a setback."3 6 At a minimum,
however, the European decision to decentralize the struggle against
sexual harassment reveals benefits-which may or may not offset
what was lost-that ought to encourage American reformers.
b. The Federalist Laboratory
Louis Brandeis, himself a law reformer and a pioneer of modern
American comparative law,"' is associated with the insight that
within a federal union, states can function as laboratories, testing
and living with a legal idea.3 8 States in a federal union can be
enough like one another to make comparison meaningful, while
pursuing different solutions to problems. Not every approach will
succeed, but failures are pertinent, and successes even more
instructive, to observers.
Although Brandeis focused primarily on intra-American
comparativism, today an advocate of the federalist laboratory would
note the increased homogeneity of populations in American states
since the time of Brandeis and perhaps view Europe as a livelier
variation on this theme. Like the United States, the European
Community was fashioned out of states that all retain a separate
sense of identity. The two entities are approximately the same size
as measured by various indicators. They are both increasingly
multicultural and multiracial. Europe as a unit can be compared to
the United States, and individual nations, which still control most
of their own laws, can serve as analogues to the American states in
this type of laboratory approach.
Among the nations of Europe, laws exist that have no American
counterparts. For example, sexual harassment, so labeled, is not a
crime in the United States as it is in two European countries.
33 9
ss For an expression of this view, see Goldstein, supra note 75, at 19 (stating that
the EC recommendation is disappointing); see also supra note 194.
.. See Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412,419 & n.1 (1908) (citing the first "Brandeis
brief," which included comparisons to Europe in its support ofworkplace regulation).
Brandeis pioneered the approach to law that is implicit in this Article, that of
deciding questions and making policy inductively, based on attention to facts about
communal life, rather than deductively. See PHILIPPA STRUM, LOUIS D. BRANDEIS,
JUSTICE FOR THE PEOPLE 124-25 (1984).
s See STRUM, supra note 337, at 80.
s9 See supra note 62. Quid pro quo sexual harassment of an employee has
occasionally been punished under American criminal law. See Lovely v. Cunningham,
796 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986) (involving homosexual coercion of vulnerable employee);
cf. James Lindgren, Unraveling the Paradox of Blackmail, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 670, 685
n.82 (1984) (citing a criminal law case involving extortion of sex).
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Additionally, no national law requires American employers to state
their policy against sexual harassment in employment contracts, a
requirement now imposed on Belgian employers. 340 Other provi-
sions of the labor laws of European nations give harassed workers
more rights than they have in most American states.3 41 Europe,
in sum, has moved ahead of the United States in various ways.342
In the simplest kind of comparative inquiry, a borrower browses the
law books of another nation for ideas. Such a detour into European
law by an American comparativist would produce results.
American criminal law could change to provide for the reliable
prosecution of quid pro quo harassers. With more difficulty, the
United States could quicken its retreat from the principle of
employment at will so that, for instance, harassing a worker would
become one of the very few grounds for termination of employ-
ment. Good reasons exist to be pessimistic about the benefit of
these approaches in the United States, but reformers who study
them could devise useful modifications. As the bromide goes, two
heads are better than one; for a problem like sexual harassment,
which calls for a pluralistic solution, several approaches are better
than one.
Eventually, the racial and ethnic variety among citizens and
residents of Europe may lead to insights into the important
relationship between questions of race and sexual harassment.
Although the almost-concurrent civil rights and women's movements
raised this issue in America, Europeans live more closely with it. A
nearby war, an influx of refugees from the east and south, and the
rise of open hostility toward foreigners and racial minorities
(especially in Germany and France) forced white Europeans in the
1990s to think about race and ethnicity. During the same period,
white Americans appeared less interested in this subject. 4 White
o40 See RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 24-25 (setting forth Belgian law,
promulgated in 1992).
34 See supra note 99 (comparing European and American experience with unjust-
dismissal law as a remedy for sexual harassment).
342 In the words of one comparative lawyer, "the forward movement" in sexual
harassment "is to place greater emphasis and obligations on preventing it. But in the
U.S., the approach is to punish it after it occurs." Anita Diamant, Sexual Harassment
on Job Widespread, 24-Nation Study Says, BOSTON GLOBE, Dec. 1, 1992, at 1, 10
(quoting Constance Thomas, U.N. lawyer).
" See Mike Barnicle, Fear, Anger and a Racial Gulf, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 7, 1992,
at 21 (analyzing the division between the races and the hesitation to address the
problem); Ben Holman, Media's Surprising Problem, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Mar. 28,
1993, at 1J (discussing the media's treatment of racial issues);James Yuenger, Politics
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American feminists have long been accused of ignoring race-of
dividing women unconsciously into "women who bear the traits of
race and ethnicity" and "women" unmodified (themselves)-in their
fight against discrimination. 44  Although many writers have
responded eloquently to this charge, 45 the two struggles do
remain somewhat separate in American scholarship and activism.
I offer no bridge of this gap, only the observation that white
observers in Europe seem to view sexual harassment and sex
discrimination as closely related to issues of race and ethnicity.
4 6
How they do it may become intelligible to American comparativist-
feminists who can approach the European Community as a laborato-
ry.
347
c. Cultural Intangibles: "European Sophistication" and "American
Puritanism"
Different approaches to sexual harassment law in different
countries reflect cultural notions that are widely held yet inade-
quately examined. Studying and improving the law would mean
studying and improving these understandings. The stereotype
encountered most often in the comparative study of sexual
of Division: A Bitter Harvest, CHI. TRIB., May 11, 1992, at 1C (reviewing political
attitudes toward racial issues).
" See Harris, supra note 23, at 592; see also BELL HOOKS, AIN'T I A WOMAN:
BLACK WOMEN AND FEMINISM 141-43 (1981).
45 See, e.g., LETTY C. POGREBIN, DEBORAH, GOLDA AND ME: BEING FEMALE AND
JEWISH IN AMERICA 275-311 (1991) (describing asymmetry between the feminism of
white Jews and that of African-Americans); Coombs, supra note 207, at 294 n.58
(apologizing for white feminists' appropriation of the Anita Hill experience); Robin
West, Relativism, Objectivity, and Law, 99 YALE L.J. 1473, 1490 (1990) (book review)
(emphasizing the common ground of all persons who are disadvantaged by the legal
concept of objectivity).
My observation is grounded only in an impression gathered from living near,
and also interviewing, white Europeans for one year. For an EC allusion to race and
sexual harassment, see RUBENSTEIN & DE VRIES, supra note 23, at 11-13 (describing
an empirical study of "racially explicit sexual harassment").
347 One possible explanation of this phenomenon is that activists among
Europeans comprise a little elite of the left, whereas the more pluralistic women's
movement in America includes feminists who are indifferent to racial equality, the
gap between rich and poor, and other topics of a liberal or radical political agenda.
If this explanation is correct, it may indicate ideological tension between the two
causes of racial justice and feminism in America; perhaps American advances in
sexual harassment law could not have occurred without the efforts of feminists with
regressive views on race. For a more optimistic assessment of this division, see Emma
C.Jordan, Race, Gender, and Social Class in the Thomas Sexual Harassment Hearings: The
Hidden Fault Lines in Political Discourse, 15 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 23-24 (1992).
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harassment law pertains to sex as it is perceived in Europe and the
United States. According to this stereotype, Europeans are
sophisticated and Americans are puritanical. 48
Much needs to be said about this stereotype, as its prevalence in
America has had policy consequences. Perhaps the most important
point is that little or no evidence exists to support it, and no serious
effort has been made to isolate the grain of truth that popular
stereotypes are said to contain. Nonetheless, the notion retains a
vague kind of power, used to good advantage against American
feminists.
Critics have written that despite its rhetorical appeal to
liberation, American feminism seeks to impose a censorious, joyless
revision of sex on a diverse populace. 49 Feminist efforts against
pornography, rape (especially acquaintance rape), demonstrations
of misogyny in the military, and sexual harassment have been
described as expressions of this puritanical crusade."' 0 Puritanical
s For expressions of the stereotype in American culture, consider the literary
corpus of Henry James and F. Scott Fitzgerald; the musicals Gigi, Cabaret and Do I
Hear a Waltz?, which rely on racy images of Paris, Berlin, and Venice; Olivia de
Havilland's Academy Award-nominated portrayal ofAmerican virtue overwhelmed by
Charles Boyer in Hold Back the Dawn; the fading but still-used slang phrases where
"French" is an adjective signifying sex; the terms "art films" and "Latin [i.e. Spanish
or Italian] lovers"; Nazi images and French maid's uniforms in pornography;
Scandinavian "freedom"; and Romance-language synonyms for the techno-American
"womanizer"-Lothario, Casanova, Romeo, Don Juan, and gigolo.
England, historically separate from the rest of the continent, can fall on either
side of this divide. Compare E.M. FORSTER, A ROOM WITH A VIEW (1908) (telling the
story of an innocent English heroine awakened by love and sensuality in Florence)
with ROBERTSON DAVIES, A MIXTURE OF FRAILTIES (1957) (portraying the story of an
innocent Canadian heroine seduced by a dissolute English artist in London).
" See, e.g., Pete Hamill, Woman on the Verge of a Legal Breakdown: Feminist
Catharine MacKinnon, PLAYBOY, Jan. 1993, at 138 (comparing MacKinnon to Lenin
and Andrea Dworkin to Trotsky); R. Emmett Tyrrell, Jr., The Worst Book of the Year,
AM. SPECTATOR, Feb. 1994, at 20, 22 (calling Catharine MacKinnon "a bully"). On
November 1, 1993, I ran a NEXIS search in the Omni library of Rush Limbaugh's
neologism "feminazi," which retrieved 79 documents.
Even some feminists identify a tendency within feminism to reject or fear sexual
pleasure. See e.g., NAOMI WOLF, FIRE WITH FIRE 133-232 (1993) (contrasting her own
"power feminism" with "victim feminism").
350 See KATIE ROIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON CAMPUS
66-75 (1993) (arguing that much of the current date rape discourse draws on
Victorian notions of women and their sexuality); Camille Paglia, The Return of Carry
Nation: Feminists Catharine MacKinnon and Andrea Dworkin, PLAYBOY, Oct. 1992, at
36 (attacking the anti-pornography effort); Charley Reese, Tailhook Outrage a Victorian
Reaction in the Age of Caligula, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIB., May 4, 1993, at A6 (arguing
that the Tailhook incident accusers hypocritically appeal to standards of the nine-
teenth century in bringing harassment claims against their fellow aviators).
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compared to where? A mythical Europe-different from, yet similar
to, America-becomes necessary.,51 Even the linguistic reference
to the Puritans evokes an image of a New Jerusalem on the
American continent-a rejection of Europe. Without the contrast of
"European sophistication," "American puritanism" would lose much
of its meaning. The contrast wounds liberal reformers in a
vulnerable place. Policymaking elites appear to prize their belief in
their own worldliness, and they acquiesce in the idea of "European
sophistication." 52 Yet this distinction between Europeans and
Americans rests on sparse evidence. One need not endorse every
goal on the feminist list mentioned above-I do not-to be dubious
of the charge of puritanism that opponents of feminism raise, and
to observe that a fanciful notion of "European sophistication"
buttresses this construct.
Those who will carry out future research in comparative sexual
harassment law will hear of "European sophistication" versus
"American puritanism" as an explanation for the different, and
apparently weaker, European response to this problem. I believe
that the distinction is overdrawn and that this exaggeration retards
feminist progress in America, but it will fall to other writers to
extract whatever truth lies in the contrast. As detailed previously,
my own explanation of the difference in approaches to sexual
harassment also relies on notions of culture-the European decision
to limit access to courts, and a related skepticism about fault."53
The very question "What is sexual harassment?" is itself culturally
laden.35 4 Attention to Europe will reveal a hidden foundation that
" Camille Paglia has frequently invoked American puritanism and European
sophistication in her attacks on mainstream American feminism. SeeJoan Connell,
Clarence Thomas Hearings Widen Chasm Between Men, Women, HOUSTON CHRON., Oct.
20, 1991, at A25 (quoting Paglia on American feminists). In an interview, Paglia
alluded to the many European people and things she admires-Oscar Wilde, the
Marquis de Sade, "The Birth of Venus," Ingmar Bergman-while comparing American
feminism to the Kremlin, and charging it with warping women's "instincts to beauty
and pleasure." See Michael Kilian, Hurricane Camille: A Torrent from the Feminist
Whom Feminists Love to Hate, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 6, 1992, § 6, at 4.
" This acquiescence can be inferred from the lack of a response to the charge.
Elites, of course, may simply believe that reference to "European sophistication" as
a basis for attacking feminist projects is too silly and trivial to warrant a response. As
I have argued, however, once "European sophistication" is conceded, it becomes
harder for feminists to maintain that their ideal world includes a place for sexual
excitement and novelty.
's See supra part II.
" See Lloyd R. Cohen, Sexual Harassment and the Law, SOCIETY, May-June 1991,
at 8, 9-11.
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legal doctrine can obscure.
d. Ameliorating an Impasse
In arguing that attention to comparative sexual harassment law
can expose a somewhat unfair tactic used by critics of feminism, I
do not want to neglect an apparently paradoxical point: this
attention can also improve relations between American feminists
and their critics. Cultural comparison, in the setting of comparative
law, would move American law forward, out of a partial impasse.
The two camps tend to label each other as harassers-and-their-
apologists and prudes-and-feminist-censors, and, therefore, little
dialogue can take place. Looking at Europe may offer a way out.
The former camp (those who appear to condone harassment) can
see that Europe, less inclined to regulate sex through law than the
United States, has nonetheless taken a stance against sexual
harassment that has effected real change. The latter camp (those
who would escalate measures used currently to remedy this
problem) can examine the apparent tolerance of some degree of
sexual harassment in Europe. As I have argued, this apparent
tolerance is more than capitulation, or failure to see the feminist
light, although it shows a weaker commitment to principles than
American feminists would accept. Without necessarily condoning
any European laxity, American feminists can revisit their demands
to see which matter the most, and which might sensibly be dropped.
Advocates and opponents of a stronger stance against sexual
harassment in America live in a pluralistic society with no consensus
about what constitutes harassment or how it ought to be remedied.
Europe offers lessons to both groups.
2. A Word of Warning
The mutual influence of comparative law poses several dangers.
Perhaps foremost among them is the fear that emulation causes
borrowers to lose more than they gain."'5 European reformers
have been haunted by negative images of the United States as they
seek to make sexual harassment preventable and punishable; they
have alluded to their dread of "American excesses."356 Reform,
s See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, THE RHETORIC OF REACTION: PERVERSITY,
FUTILITY, JEOPARDY (1991) (offering a history of the conservative or reactionary
contention that reform either cannot work or will make problems worse).
" Riding, supra note 9, at 1.
LAW, CULTURE, AND HARASSMENT
should it go too far, would import a foreign culture: censorious,
litigious, fearful of sexuality, repressed, and full of costly legal
minefields. Their American counterparts, were they to look to
Europe at all, would likely see it as a place that has yet to grasp and
acknowledge the reality of sexual harassment, a place where injured
persons lack redress in the courts and where the law scarcely
impinges on male privilege.
At a more general level, a connection between comparative law
and legal feminism such as the one proposed here has few prece-
dents, and the precedents suggest that looking at Europe tends to
temper rather than advance feminist progress.357 As this Article
has shown, attention to Europe generally leads a comparativist away
from the American idea that private law suitably expresses and
reifies individual rights. The temptation for Americans is to stop
there: to take away rather than add. And how much can a
comparative method demand? Comparative law in the United States
(in contrast to some European nations, especially Germany) has
always been a marginal force for change, even when a foreign law
under study fits American needs closely and would be simple to
emulate. The difficult comparativism that I have advocated here
may be too much to expect from Americans, who quite accurately
see themselves as world leaders in the fight against sexual harass-
ment.
Yet because sexual harassment is more than sexism, or a subset
of employment discrimination, or a women's problem, or a species
of tort, or a European-style condition of work, the breadth of the
topic justifies and compels an expansive recruitment of all persons
who are touched by this harm. Comparative law is only one of the
devices that can widen our understanding of sexual harassment.
Having mentioned the dangers of this device, I note that within the
pluralistic array of influences that will continue to explain sexual
harassment, comparative law will be just one of many approaches.
Its risks accordingly will be reduced by diversification. As for its
benefits, one of the best is the hope of taking sexual harassment
beyond the converted, committed feminist reformers to those
"' The leading work bridging comparative law and feminist topics is MARY ANN
GLENDON, ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987). Professor Glendon is
led tojoin the numerous critics of Roe v. Wade; she would leave abortion rights to the
legislature and is skeptical of American rights-discourse generally. See GLENDON,
supra note 95, at 58-60.
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Americans who do not yet appreciate the meaning of sexual
harassment in their own lives.
CONCLUSION
To convince a reader that sexual harassment harms workers,
takes subtle forms, ought to be prevented as well as remedied,
causes economic loss as well as dignitary harm, and is imperfectly
redressed in the courts, one need hardly write yet another law
review article. Workplace sexual harassment is now a phenomenon
whose evil nobody denies. The scholarly debates that I have summa-
rized are mere quibbles within this overwhelming American
consensus. Yet work and controversy remain. Where do we go
from here to build a better law of workplace sexual harassment?
Exploring this question, I have defended a new pro-
cess-comparing and borrowing, from the vantage point of an
innovator-and I have shown how institutional competencies might
develop to enforce, communicate, and nourish this better law.
These competencies would rest on a base that is still unfamiliar to
Americans. Sexual harassment, I have argued, ought to be
perceived as a problem of the workplace. In the United States, this
problem has traditionally been viewed as wrongful conduct between
workers, or the subjugation and control of women by men. Both
perceptions share a preoccupation with fault, and this preoccu-
pation has given short shrift to a possible third concept, that of
detrimental workplace conditions. I have offered a European-
influenced version of such an approach. I have also argued-with
greater insistence-in favor of a multifaceted approach to the
problem of sexual harassment. No single paradigm ought to
dominate. Used selectively in combination, with the help of
comparative study, all three perspectives can help to explain and
cure this compelling problem of the workplace.
From personal experience, I emphasize that this comparative
study, especially when invoked to address a practical problem, is
frustrating, risky, often distressing, and hard to do well. To the
warnings that I have detailed in the last Part of the Article, I add
another. The effort to create a law of sexual harassment informed
by comparative study is uniquely complicated by the daunting
nature of sexuality itself. Sex is a misunderstood subject, and this
level of misunderstanding is unlikely to be changed in the near
future. A universal ignorance about foreign cultures compounds
this confusion. The endeavor I have described is fraught with
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prejudice, misuse, and partial truths garbled in transmission.
Despite the hobbling effect of fear and ignorance, however, the
sexual harassment law of the world moves forward through
comparative observation and learning.
The comparativism now taking place in sexual harassment law
offers practical and theoretical insights to be applied to the solution
of problems. This process-pluralistic rather than unidirectional-is
suited to a newer world political order with humbler superpowers,
blurred dichotomies, more nations, and freer exchange. As a strand
of both comparative law and legal feminism, comparative sexual
harassment law contributes a concrete problem and specific work to
do.358 In the building of comparative sexual harassment law, both
comparative law and feminism have developed a new method of
operation, and the method has achieved real change. A problem
has been named, condemned, and fought. Regardless of what may
await, this new device has revealed the first hints of its great
strength.
358 In both comparative law and feminism, elder statesmen and stateswomen have
issued a call for new specifics. See Herbert Bernstein, Book Review, 40 AM.J. COMP.
L. 261,261 (1992) (urging fellow comparativists to produce "hard-nosed comparative
work on clearly defined specific institutions or subject-matter areas"); see also BETTY
FRIEDAN, THE SECOND STAGE 343 (1981).
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